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ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS: AN EVOLVING 
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY 
Lynda L. Butler* 
From the world's water-poor areas to its water-rich regions, 
countless conflicts have arisen over the appropriate allocation of 
interests in water resources. These conflicts have occurred at all 
levels of the political system, pitting nation against nation, state 
against state, and locality against locality.1 Although the disputes 
generally involve one overriding question-who has the right to use 
water-the legal issues involved in resolving that question span a 
wide range of matters.2 The longstanding and complex nature of 
the disputes thus stands as a testament to the value and impor-
tance of water resources. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. B.S. 1973, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1978, University of Virginia. 
Portions of this article are based on a speech entitled "Protection of Instream Uses: Pub-
lic vs. Private Rights," which was presented May 19, 1989 at the Workshop. on Eastern 
Water Law sponsored by the American Bar Association. 
The author wishes to thank Diane Davis for her research assistance and Della Harris and 
her staff for their able word processing skills. 
' Water law treatises and articles provide ample evidence of these disputes. See 1 H. 
Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights preface at 1 (1904) (estimating the number 
of court decisions involving water disputes to be about 17,000 as of 1904). See generally 2 
Waters and Water Rights §§ 100-107, 130-134, 140-145, 150-152 (R. Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 
1978) (discussing federal/state relations, interstate stream conflicts, Indian water rights 
claims, and international problems); 5 id. §§ 414, 430, 445 (discussing water rights determi-
nations under the appropriation doctrine); Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in 
a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 
47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95 (1985) (discussing consumptive water rights disputes arising in 
America's riparian jurisdictions). American law has even developed separate legal doctrines 
to govern the different types of disputes. See, e.g., id. at 134-36 (discussing the doctrin.e of 
equitable apportionment developed by the United States Supreme Court to govern water 
disputes between states). See generally A. Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources 
(1989) (explaining the law governing water allocation in the United States). Disputes over 
water are not likely to decline in the future. See generally G.A. Res. 35/18, 35 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 48) at 101 (1980) (discussing the lack of access to safe and ample water supplies 
and the lack of sanitation facilities existing in the world); 1987-1988 Council on Environ-
mental Quality Ann. Rep. ch. 3 (discussing existing water conditions, programs, and recent 
trends); 1 U.S. Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources, 1975-2000 (1978) 
(discussing America's increasing water use needs); Butler, supra, at 96-99 (describing water 
supply problems facing the eastern United States). 
• For example, disputes arising under the common law riparian doctrine, which tradition-
ally has governed water allocation in the eastern United States, typically raise questions 
about the reasonableness of a water use, about the area of land that can be benefitted by a 
use, and about the transferability of water rights. See generally Butler, supra note 1, at 105-
56 (discussing these questions). 
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Given the long history of water use conflict, it should not be sur-
prising that man has found new grounds for dispute. Water uses 
generally fall into one of two main categories. The first category, 
out-of-stream or consumptive uses, involves those uses that require 
the removal or diversion of water from a watercourse to the place 
of use. Irrigation, stock watering, industrial water use, and residen-
tial use are examples of consumptive uses. 3 By contrast, the second 
category, instream or nonconsumptive uses, does not require the 
removal of water and refers instead to those benefits derived from 
water while it is still flowing in the stream. Examples of instream 
uses include navigation and recreational uses, as well as mainte-
nance of water flows for aesthetic and ecological purposes. 4 While 
the traditional focus of water disputes has been on private conflicts 
involving competing consumptive uses, current disputes have 
raised new issues and are shifting the focus away from purely pri-
vate matters to tensions between public and private interests. Of 
particular concern today are the conflicting interests of private 
consumptive uses and public nonconsumptive needs. 
As the demand for out-of-stream uses continues to rise, the need 
for protection of instream uses has become increasingly apparent. 
The survival of many aquatic and terrestrial species depends on 
the instream flow, or the quantity of water flowing through a 
stream. An adequate level of flowing water also is required to 
maintain water quality and to prevent other drastic changes in the 
physical characteristics of watercourses. Furthermore, people re-
quire adequate instream flows for recreational and aesthetic 
purposes.6 
Despite the need for protection of instream uses, out-of-stream 
uses have, for the most part, prevailed in both western and eastern 
states. America's water allocation laws, which developed in the 
context of the private property system, have made few, if any, ac-
commodations for public interests.6 Although government entities 
3 See Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream 
Uses, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407, 407. 
• See id. 
• For a discussion of the benefits of instream flow, see 1 U.S. Water Resources Council, 
supra note 1, at 42-47. See generally U.S. National Water Comm'n, Water Policies for the 
Future 19-37 (1973) (discussing the environmental effects of water use) [hereinafter cited as 
Water Policies]; Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water 
Rights Administration, 2 Ecology L.Q. 695, 710-21 (1972) (discussing environmental consid-
erations relating to instream· use). 
• See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.02 (discussing the development of prior appropria-
tion); Butler, supra note 1, at 105-56 (discussing the development of private consumptive 
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generally have been able to meet public consumptive needs 
through condemnation proceedings, innovative arrangements with 
water rights holders, helpful statutory modifications, or aggressive 
manipulation of common law principles,7 public nonconsumptive 
needs have posed serious political, economic, and philosophical 
problems. Recognition of nonconsumptive values raises difficult 
questions about our political and economic structure and about the 
ethical responsibilities of the citizenry. 
For several decades, legal scholars and lawmakers have been ex-
ploring ways the law can recognize and promote the nonconsump-
tive needs of the public.8 In recent years, their efforts have begun 
to be realized as a growing number of courts and legislatures have 
decided to protect instream uses with a wide variety of devices. 
Some of these devices involve judicial interpretation or expansion 
of common law doctrine, while others reflect changes in statutory 
or administrative law.9 Although the variety of the protective de-
vices might suggest otherwise, they do share one common trait: all 
represent an important step in the evolution of public property 
rights in the environmental area. Gradually the law has begun to 
recognize the legitimacy of public environmental water 
rights-that is, public interests in environmental uses of water re-
sources.10 Today, through the recent judicial and legislative 
rights under riparianism). 
7 In the eastern United States, accommodation of public consumptive needs has been a 
particularly difficult process. While some eastern jurisdictions have modified their common 
law water allocation systems by statute to provide for public consumptive needs, many 
others have kept those systems basically intact. Government entities attempting to develop 
public water supplies under eastern common law systems face a number of serious obstacles. 
See generally Butler, supra note 1 (discussing those obstacles). 
8 See, e.g., Water Policies, supra note 5, at 271-79; R. Freeman & F. Robinson, Opportu-
nities to Protect Instream Flows in Vermont and Pennsylvania (Fish & Wildlife Service, 
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, biological report 86(1), Apr. 1986); Johnson, Public Trust Protec-
tion for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233 (1980). See generally A. 
Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.01-.06 (discussing the development of public water use rights). 
9 For further discussion of these judicial and legislative changes, see infra Parts II & III. 
1° For purposes of this article, the phrase "environmental uses of water resources" will 
refer collectively to those uses that require the protection of the physical characteristics of 
water resources-that is, those uses that require the maintenance of flow conditions. Among 
other possibilities, environmental water uses will include the maintenance of instream flows 
for navigational, ecological, aesthetic, and recreational purposes. 
Under this definition, the phrase "environmental water use" is, for the most part, synony-
mous with instream use. But, though the two have considerable overlap, the phrase "envi-
ronmental water use" has stronger environmental connotations. Whereas the phrase "envi-
ronmental water use" stresses the relationship between instream use and the total 
environment of a watercourse, instream use simply refers to any nonconsumptive use of 
flowing water that produces a benefit. 
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changes, that evolutionary process has reached the point where the 
public interest needs to be recognized as a property right. Al-
though such recognition would defy our system of private property, 
public property rights are, in appropriate circumstances, needed as 
a complement to private property. Many instream water uses raise 
the types of concerns that both justify and necessitate public prop-
erty rights. 
To demonstrate the applicability of the public property concept 
to instream uses, this article first describes the various forms of 
instream protection that have developed under traditional and cur-
rent law. Part I examines the relatively insignificant role of in-
stream values under traditional water allocation systems, while 
Parts II and III discuss the emerging forms of judicial and legisla-
tive protection, respectively. The focus of these discussions is not 
to provide an exhaustive study of the various instream protection 
programs, but rather to identify the current status, direction, and 
limitations of the instream protection movement. Part IV then 
suggests how the public property concept would help the evolution 
of the public interest in environmental water uses. 
I. INSTREAM USES UNDER TRADITIONAL WATER ALLOCATION 
SYSTEMS 
Two main water allocation systems define the nature of rights 
and interests in America's watercourses. One system, known as 
riparianism, generally governs water rights in the eastern portion 
of the United States. The second system, referred to as prior ap-
propriation, prevails in the western part of the country. A brief 
description of the two systems and of the status of instream values 
under each one demonstrates the need for reform.11 Although a 
number of factors have contributed to this need, the private rights 
perspective of traditional water allocation systems probably is the 
primary reason why the traditional systems do not adequately pro-
tect the public's nonconsumptive interests.12 
11 For a more comprehensive discussion of the two systems, see A. Tarlock, supra note 1, 
cbs. 3, 5. 
" Another important factor is the judiciary's restrictive interpretation of common law 
allocation principles. In many jurisdictions, the courts have been reluctant to redefine those 
principles in light of changing needs and values. See generally Butler, supra note 1, at 105-
56 (discussing the restrictive approach of courts in riparian jurisdictions). 
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A. Riparianism 
Under the riparian doctrine, water rights in natural watercourses 
arise as incidents to ownership of land abutting a watercourse. 13 
Because many riparian landowners can be located along a water-
course, serious conflicts sometimes arise between users. Riparian 
jurisdictions resolve those conflicts through one of two approaches: 
the natural flow doctrine or the reasonable use rule. 14 
The natural flow doctrine generally entitles each riparian propri-
etor to use the adjoining watercourse in its natural condition with-
out perceptible interference by other users. 111 If a riparian is using 
water for natural purposes, like drinking and other household pur-
poses, then she may use as much water as necessary even though 
the entire flow is depleted. But if a riparian is using water for arti-
ficial purposes-that is, for purposes not essential to life-then the 
riparian may use the water only if he does not materially interfere 
with the natural flow.16 
Although a 1982 study suggests otherwise, 17 the natural flow doc-
trine appears, in theory, to offer significant protection for instream 
uses. 18 Indeed, some courts have applied the natural flow doctrine 
to enjoin uses that cause excessive lowering of water levels.19 Addi-
tionally, at least one court has applied the doctrine to enjoin a use 
that prevented other riparians from boating and fishing and that 
otherwise impaired the scenic value of their riverfront property.20 
As a practical matter, though, the natural flow doctrine will proba-
" Id. at 105. Under traditional law, water rights in lakes technically were known as litto-
ral rights. Though the law governing these rights paralleled the riparian doctrine, different 
terminology apparently was necessitated by a restrictive definition of watercourse which ex-
cluded lakes. See 2 H. Farnham, supra note 1, § 458; 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 
~ 709 [2][b][iv) (1990); 1A G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Prop-
erty §§ 256, 259, 265, 280 (1980 & Supp. 1981). Modern commentators define a watercourse 
more broadly to include lakes. See, e.g., A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 3.05[1], 3.06[2]. Today, 
then, riparian rights would attach to lakes as well as streams. See id. § 3.05[1], at 3-13. 
•• Ausness, supra note 3, at 416. 
16 !d. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 3.12[1], [2] (discussing early and current 
theories of natural flow). 
" Ausness, supra note 3, at 416. 
11 See Davis, The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36 
Ark. L. Rev. 47 (1982). The study summarily dismisses a few cases that relied on the natural 
flow doctrine to protect recreational use, noting that the cases no longer are "viable prece-
dent." !d. at 55. The study also notes that riparian caselaw historically has ignored ecologi-
cal instream uses. !d. at 72. 
•• Accord A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 3.12[2); Ausness, supra note 3, at 417. 
•• See, e.g., Dardenne Realty Co. v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937). 
20 See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). 
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bly have little effect on the promotion of instream values; cur-
rently, most riparian jurisdictions follow the second approach to 
resolving use conflicts.21 
The reasonable use rule entitles each riparian proprietor to make 
reasonable uses of the adjoining watercourse for the benefit of her 
riparian land.22 Under this rule, a riparian's rights are not absolute, 
for other riparians along the same watercourse also have an 
"equal" right to make reasonable uses of water.23 Whether a use is 
reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case. A use that initially is reasonable may become unreasonable 
over time. Factors considered by the courts in evaluating a use's 
reasonableness include normal stream conditions, the purpose of 
the use, and the compatibility of the use with other uses. In evalu-
ating a conflict, the courts tend to prefer domestic uses, such as 
drinking, bathing, and cooking.24 
The few cases that have applied the reasonable use standard to 
recreational or similar instream uses suggest that private instream 
uses can find protection under the reasonable use rule.211 In a 1955 
Arkansas case, for example, the court concluded that the defend-
ant's pumping operations unreasonably interfered with the plain-
tiffs' use of a lake for fishing, recreation, and other lawful pur-
poses.26 These cases, however, are not true public rights cases. 
Although the courts may have protected instream use, the party 
conducting the use sought protection as a private riparian proprie-
tor. The courts, in other words, have not used the reasonable use 
rule to recognize public rights in instream uses. 
In conclusion, the riparian doctrine provides some protection for 
instream uses. Under both the natural flow doctrine and the rea-
sonable use rule, instream uses theoretically would seem to receive 
as much protection as consumptive uses. As a practical matter, 
though, the riparian doctrine's protection of instream uses is lim-
ited. Because the doctrine traditionally only recognizes private use 
rights, the public interest in instream uses is protected only to the 
•• See Ausness, supra note 3, at 417. 
n See Butler, supra note 1, at 105-06. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 3.12[4] 
(discussing the development of the reasonable use rule). 
u Butler, supra note 1, at 106. 
•• !d. at 126-27. 
26 See Ausness, supra note 3, at 417-18 (discussing Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 
S.W.2d 129 (1955); Callens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); 
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950)). 
36 Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955). 
1990) Environmental Water Rights 329 
extent that it coincides with private rights. Furthermore, for the 
public to benefit, a private riparian must be willing to enforce his 
instream use rights through litigation. Due to the high costs of liti-
gation and the relatively intangible benefits of instream uses, it is 
doubtful that many riparians would have sufficient economic in-
centive to enforce instream rights. 27 
B. Prior Appropriation ' 
Under the prior appropriation system, a water user who first di-
verts water from a watercourse and uses it for a beneficial purpose 
acquires rights superior to subsequent users. Unlike riparian 
rights, appropriative rights are not restricted to waterfront land-
owners; nor do appropriative rights have to benefit riparian land. 
The protection that the doctrine can offer to instream uses, how-
ever, is limited in other ways. To avoid losing her rights, for in-
stance, an appropriator must not only claim, but also use, a defi-
nite quantity of water. Moreover, because of its historical and legal 
development, the prior appropriation system favors consumptive 
uses over instream uses. 28 
Historically courts following the prior appropriation doctrine 
have disfavored instream uses because of the beneficial use re-
quirement. Under a traditional interpretation of that requirement, 
instream uses are inherently wasteful since they require water to 
remain i.n place and therefore reduce the water available for con-
sumptive uses.29 Over time, however, courts have become more re-
ceptive to instream uses. Several courts, for example, have recog-
nized fishing and recreation as beneficial uses. 30 
Courts in prior appropriation jurisdictions have also disfavored 
instream uses because of the doctrine's actual diversion require-
07 Ausness, supra note 3, at 418. Compare id. (where the author doubts the ability of the 
riparian system to protect public instream values) with Davis, supra note 17, at 80 (where 
the author concludes that courts in riparian jurisdictions seem to be willing to protect flows 
for recreational instream use and that no precedents inhibit extending such a right to the 
public for recreational and natural habitat uses). 
•• Ausness, supra note 3, at 418-19. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.02-.03 
(discussing the development of the different theories of prior appropriation). Though a ripa-
rian land restriction does not apply, some appropriation jurisdictions are beginning to im-
pose a watershed limitation. Such a limitation would provide some protection for instream 
uses. See id. § 5.11. 
•• See Ausness, supra note 3, at 419-20. 
•• See, e.g., State ex ret. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 
P.2d 421 (1945). See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.16 (discussing the beneficial use 
requirement). 
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ment. 31 Under this requjrement, a user must physically divert 
water from a watercourse in order to perfect an appropriation. Ap-
parently the courts have imposed this requirement to prevent a 
single party from successfully claiming appropriative rights to an 
entire stream when that party was not actually using all of the 
stream's flow. In addition, the requirement helps to ensure that 
other water users have notice of a new user's claim.32 Under a 
strict interpretation of the actual diversion requirement, instream 
uses would not be protected since they do not, by definition, in-
volve a diversion. A more liberal interpretation, however, might 
protect instream appropriations if the appropriator could establish 
that she had acquired physical control of the water. Although an 
actual diversion would be one way of establishing such control, an 
instream appropriator also could acquire physical control by im-
pounding the water or by becoming the owner of the banks of the 
watercourse. 33 But even under the more liberal approach, the ac-
tual diversion requirement still can limit the effectiveness of in-
stream protection measures. 34 
Like riparian jurisdictions, then, traditional prior appropriation 
states offer little hope to those seeking recognition of the public 
interest in instream use. Even more so than its eastern counter-
part, the prior appropriation doctrine incorporates the private con-
sumptive perspective into its legal requirements. Protection of in-
stream values thus has required, and continues to require, 
deliberate changes to the traditional water allocation system. Re-
gardless of whether the changes occur by judicial or legislative ac-
tion, they must provide affirmative recognition of the public inter-
est in order to overcome the private perspective of traditional law. 
II. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES 
Over the years, several different techniques for protecting m-
31 See Ausness, supra note 3, at 420. 
32 /d. 
33 See Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 598-602, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 518, 524-26 (1979). Although commentators have concluded that modern permit 
statutes make the actual diversion requirement obsolete, see, e.g., A. Tarlock, supra note 1, 
§ 5.15, some prior appropriation jurisdictions still enforce the requirement. See Ausness, 
supra note 3, at 420. 
34 See, e.g., Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 599, 603, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 524, 527 (1979) (where the court concluded that, without express legisla-
tive action, it must deny an instream appropriation application when the applicant failed to 
establish physical activity or control sufficient to meet the more liberal diversion 
requirement). 
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stream values have evolved through the courts. One technique in-
volves the use of the public trust doctrine to limit the exercise of 
consumptive water rights. A second technique concerns an expan-
sion of the navigability concept to include instream values. A third 
uses the federal reserved water rights doctrine to legitimate in-
stream values. A fourth involves interpreting environmental provi-
sions in state constitutions as imposing a duty of environmental 
protection. Though the techniques differ, each reflects a commit-
ment to the public interest not generally present under traditional 
water law. The techniques thus represent an important step in the 
evolution of public property rights. 
A. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine recognizes that certain resources, prin-
cipally navigable waters and their submerged beds, are held by 
each state in trust for the benefit of its citizens. 36 Developed in 
large part by the United States Supreme Court, the public trust 
doctrine prevents states from totally abdicating their trust respon-
sibilities or from substantially impairing the public interest in 
trust resources. 36 The United States Supreme Court, for example, 
applied the doctrine to invalidate an Illinois statute granting a sig-
nificant portion of the bed of Lake Michigan to a railroad com-
pany. 37 The Court explained that the state's abdication of its own-
ership interests in the valuable submerged lands was "a gross 
perversion of the trust over the property."38 
Under the public trust doctrine, resources are impressed with 
the trust in order to protect the public's right to the enjoyment of 
certain uses. Courts traditionally have defined public trust uses as 
including navigation, commerce, and sometimes fishing and the op-
eration of public sewage systems.39 In recent years, some courts 
have expanded the doctrine to include uses like environmental 
preservation, swimming, bathing, and other recreational pur-
poses.40 In New Jersey, for example, the ·courts have extended the 
•• See L. Butler & M. Livingston, Virginia Tidal and Coastal Law 105 (1988). See gener-
ally id. ch. 5 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine). 
•• See generally id. § 5.2.A (discussing the emergence of the public trust doctrine in the 
United States Supreme Court). 
37 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
•• ld. at 455. 
•• See, e.g., id. at 452; Mayor of Newark v. Sayre, 60 N.J. Eq. 361, 369-70, 45 A. 985, 987-
88 (1900); State ex rei. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 828 (N.C. 1988). 
40 See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 5.2 (discussing judicial per-
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public trust to recreational uses of beach areas, even those that are 
man-made.41 Similarly, in California and Mississippi, the courts 
have concluded that valid public trust purposes include recrea-
tional pursuits, environmental protection, and the enhancement of 
aquatic and marine life.42 As one court explained, the public trust 
is not a static concept, but rather evolves with the times as the 
needs and values of the people change.'3 
Despite this type of expansive language in judicial opinions, only 
a few court decisions have directly applied the public trust doc-
trine to protect instream uses." In one of those decisions, United 
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conserva-
tion Commission,'6 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded 
that the doctrine applied to state waters and obligated state offi-
cials to consider the impact of proposed allocations of water re-
sources on the public trust.'6 The controversy in United 
Plainsmen focused on the issuance of future water permits for 
coal-related power and energy production facilities. Plaintiff 
sought an injunction against the issuance of those permits until 
state officials developed adequate short-term and long-term plans 
for the conservation and development of the state's natural re-
sources. To support its request, plaintiff pointed to statutory pro-
visions defining state water policy.47 Plaintiff argued that the pro-
visions imposed mandatory planning responsibilities on state 
officials and that those responsibilities had to be met prior to the 
issuance of the water permits. The trial court disagreed, dismissing 
the claim. 
spectives on the public trust doctrine). 
•• See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 227-32, 430 A.2d 881, 
886·88 (1981); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 178-81, 393 A.2d 571, 573-74 
(1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 301-10, 294 
A.2d 47, 54-55 (1972). For further discussion of New Jersey's handling of the public trust 
doctrine, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 5.2.C. 
42 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); 
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
•• Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U,S. 469 (1988). 
44 See Ausness, supra note 3, at 421. 
•• 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
•• See id. at 462. 
47 Among other matters, the statutory provisions declared that state water resources pol-
icy included the" 'execution and periodic updating of comprehensive, coordinated and well-
balanced short- and long-term plans and programs for the conservation and development' " 
of state waters. ld. at 459 (quoting the statutory provisions). 
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In concluding that the complaint stated a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to 
constitutional and statutory principles and to the general policies 
of the public trust doctrine. The court rejected the plaintiff's inter-
pretation of statutory law, explaining that the provisions were, at 
best, "a significant advisory policy statement."48 But the court did 
agree with plaintiff that "the discretionary authority of state offi-
cials to allocate vital state resources" is limited by the public trust 
doctrine.49 As the court explained, the public trust doctrine is "as-
suming an expanding role in environmental law."~0 At a minimum 
the doctrine requires "evidence of some planning by appropriate 
state ... [officials] in the allocation of public water resources."M 
Such planning should include "a determination of the potential ef-
fect of the allocation of water" on the present and future water 
needs of the state.112 
In a decision similar to United Plainsmen, the Supreme Court of 
California decided that the public trust doctrine provides an inde-
pendent basis for reviewing and evaluating water allocation deci-
sions. The California decision, National Audubon Society v. Supe-
rior Court of Alpine County,113 involved a dispute over the 
diversion of water from Mono Lake by the City of Los Angeles. 
The diversions had resulted in significant ecological changes in 
Mono Lake. Besides losing one-third of its surface area, the lake 
had experienced a drop in its water level and a change in its living 
resources.114 Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin the diversion, arguing that 
the diversion's adverse environmental consequences impermissibly 
impaired the public trust interest in the shores, beds, and waters 
of Mono Lake. 
In agreeing that the public trust doctrine applies to California's 
appropriative water rights system, the court rejected the argument 
that the system had subsumed the trust doctrine. The court ex-
plained that both the public trust doctrine and the water alloca-
•• /d. at 460 . 
•• !d. 
00 !d. at 463. 
01 !d. 
•• !d. at 462. 
03 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied sub nom. City of Los 
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. National Audubon Society, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
•• See id. at 429-31, 658 P.2d at 715-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53 (discussing the environ-
mental consequences of the diversions)_ 
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tion system "embody important precepts."55 Embracing one set of 
principles and rejecting the other would lead to unbalanced re-
source decisions. A better accommodation would result, in the 
court's view, by interpreting the trust doctrine as imposing a con-
tinuing and affirmative duty on the state to consider public trust 
interests in making water allocation decisions. Under the doctrine 
the state owed a duty, as trustee, to consider the effect of proposed 
water allocations on the public trust and to "preserve, so far as 
consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the 
trust."116 Although the court did not define this duty more specifi-
cally, it did focus on certain factors throughout its opinion. Among 
others, those factors included the effect of a proposed use on the 
physical and chemical characteristics of the affected area, the use's 
impact on fisheries, wildfowl, and other natural communities, and 
the impact on the health of nearby residents.117 
Both United Plainsmen and National Audubon establish that 
the public trust doctrine applies to the water allocation process, 
requiring consideration of the impact of allocation decisions on the 
public interest. This use of the public trust doctrine is not, how-
ever, a problem-free solution for protecting instream values. A re-
cent decision indicates, for example, that North Dakota's trust ob-
ligations with respect to water allocations are not that difficult to 
meet. In Bottineau County Water Resource District v. North Da-
kota Wildlife Society, 118 the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the state did not violate the public trust doctrine by 
granting drainage permits to Bottineau County. As the court ex-
plained, United Plainsmen only stated that the doctrine required 
"'controlled development of resources rather than no develop-
ment.' "59 In the Bottineau County controversy, opponents and 
supporters of the drainage permits had extensively studied and de-
bated the possible consequences of the permits. Moreover, the 
state's decisionmaking process had included detailed analysis and 
discussion of the potential impacts. Thus, the court had no diffi-
culty concluding that the state had adequately protected the pub-
lic trust interest.60 
•• /d. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
•• /d. at 446-47, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr . at 365. 
07 See id. at 428-31, 434-36, 447-48, 658 P.2d at 714-16, 719-20, 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351-
53, 356·57, 365-66. 
•• 424 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1988). 
•• /d. at 903 (quoting from United Plainsmen). 
60 /d. 
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Furthermore, some commentators have speculated that the ef-
fect of United Plainsmen will not be as great as National Audu-
bon. They explain that, in contrast to the California court, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court has attempted to rely on preexisting 
constitutional and statutory principles to · justify its decision in-
stead of recognizing the public trust obligation as independent of 
constitutional and statutory law.61 To the extent that other courts 
agree with this approach, public trust protection for instream val-
ues would be available only where states have constitutional and 
statutory provisions similar to North Dakota,s. 
Additional problems are posed by judicial application of the 
public trust doctrine to instream uses. Neither United Plainsmen 
nor National Audubon, for example, clearly defines the type of in-
terest protected by the public trust doctrine. At best, only vague 
guidelines are provided by the two courts. One of those guidelines 
is that ecological water uses qualify as a public trust interest. 
Other jurisdictions have been even less direct in defining the rela-
tionship between the public trust doctrine and the water allocation 
process. Still, an increasing number of courts are at least demon-
strating a willingness to accept the general applicability of the 
trust concept to ecological values.62 Because this general tenet is at 
the core of the National Audubon and United Plainsmen deci-
sions, instream protection through the water allocation process 
may not be far behind. 
Extending the public trust doctrine to protect instream uses also 
raises many difficult questions. Jurisdictions following National 
Audubon, for instance, will have to define the appropriate public 
trust criteria for evaluating water allocation decisions, as well as 
the role of courts and agencies in applying the criterla.63 In addi-
tion, these jurisdictions will have to decide how the protections ac-
corded instream uses under the trust doctrine relate to statutory 
protections built into the water allocation system.64 Decisions like 
61 See Ausness, supra note 3, at 427-28; Walston, The Implications of the Public Trust 
Doctrine for State Water Rights Administration, Prac. Real Est. Law. 47, 54 (July 1985). 
•• See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 & n.8, 1121 n.15 (Alaska 
1988) (where the court limited its decision to the traditionally recognized fishery interest 
but then cited with approval the National Audubon decision); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 
Wash. 2d 621, 641 & n.lO, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 & n.10 (1987) (where the court broadly 
interpreted the public trust doctrine to include recreational interests and cited with ap-
proval a California case extending the public trust to ecological values), cert. denied 486 
u.s. 1022 (1988). 
•• Walston, supra note 61, at 55, 56. 
64 See id. at 55. 
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National Audubon also create uncertainty for holders of water 
rights. To be efficient, a water allocation system must provide se-
curity to those holders. sG Because National Audubon indicates that 
the state has a continuing obligation to consider the public trust 
interest, state officials apparently have the power and the obliga-
tion to reevaluate and, where appropriate, to modify water alloca-
tion decisions. 66 
On a more positive note, the public trust doctrine provides a po-
tentially broad basis for protecting instream uses. Most states tra-
ditionally have used their police powers or express constitutional 
powers to justify regulating private property rights for the public 
good. Under their police powers, states generally may adopt rea-
sonable regulations in the interest of the public health, welfare, 
and safety without violating the constitutional rights of private 
property owners affected by the regulations and thus without hav-
ing to compensate the property owners.67 But where a regulation 
does not promote these ends or unreasonably interferes with the 
use rights or investment-backed expectations of a property owner, 
the government may have to provide compensation to the owner to 
avoid a conflict with the takings clause of the federal Constitu-
tion.68 Because the public trust theory recognizes that certain pub-
lic rights arise from a sovereign's interests in navigable waters, 
these rights arguably limit, instead of regulate, private property 
rights. Under this interpretation the private rights would be inher-
ently subordinate to the public rights and could be impaired, with-
out compensation, by state conduct designed to promote the public 
rights.69 
86 See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the 
need to reward investment and promote efficiency by recognizing property rights); Butler, 
supra note 1, at 130-37 (discussing the need to clarify riparian water rights and eliminate 
some of their uncertainty). 
66 Accord Ausness, supra note 3, at 428. 
•• See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); R. Epstein, Takings 
107-12 (1985). For a comprehensive discussion of the police power, see E. Freund, The Po-
lice Power (1904). 
88 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978). See generally Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" 
Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1183-1201 (1967) (discussing some of the key takings tests 
developed by the courts). 
80 For further discussion of the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the 
takings clause, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 20.2.A.2. 
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B. Expansion of the Definition of Navigability 
For historical reasons, the American legal system has distin-
guished between public and private waters in recognizing public 
water use rights.70 Much of that distinction, in turn, has focused on 
the concept of navigability.71 Under the English common law, the 
courts generally defined public waters as those waters that sup-
ported commercial navigation.72 Waters meeting this standard 
were, for the most part, subject to public navigation, commerce, 
and, in the view of some historians, fishing. 73 American courts have 
similarly relied on the navigability concept to recognize public 
rights in water resources. As explained earlier, the concept serves 
as one of the traditional bases of the public trust doctrine, which is 
now an important and independent source of public water use 
rights.74 Additionally, in the early 1800s, the United States Su-
preme Court interpreted the commerce clause of the federal Con-
stitution as incorporating the navigability concept.711 Under this in-
terpretation, the commerce clause empowers Congress to keep 
navigable waters "open and free"76 and thus subjects those waters 
to a federal navigation servitude. The constitutional basis of the 
servitude serves, then, as a source . of the federal government's 
70 See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.02[1], at 8-2. 
71 Other factors used to identify "public waters" include the nature of the sovereign inter· 
est in submerged beds and the existence of waste lands underlying tidal waters. See id. § 
8.02[2]. Government ownership of submerged beds traditionally entitles the public to use 
overlying waters. /d. § 8.02[2J[a]. Furthermore, if the beds are beneath tidal waters, the 
beds are presumed, under the common law, to be waste lands owned by the sovereign. /d. § 
8.02[2][b). Neither factor, however, is a necessary condition for the recognition of public 
rights. See id. § 8.02[2]. 
72 /d. § 9.03[1][a). 
73 See id. § 8.02[2)(a], at 8·4. See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 
5.l.B (discussing public rights under English law). 
74 See supra notes 35-39, 68-69 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the 
theoretical bases of the public trust doctrine, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, 
§ 5.1. 
76 In the 1824 decision Gibbons u. Ogden, the Court declared that the commerce clause 
"comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navi-
gation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the 
several States, or with the Indian tribes.'" 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). Before making 
this declaration; the Court observed the link between the commerce clause and prior under-
standings and practices. After noting that the federal government had controlled navigation 
since "the commencement of the government," the Court stated: "All America understands, 
and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation .... The 
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the 
people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming 
it.'' /d. at 190. 
76 United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05 (1940). 
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power to regulate navigable waters and related resources. In addi-
tion, as a product of the common law, the federal navigation servi-
tude generally entitles the public to a right of passage in navigable 
waters.77 
The meaning of the navigability concept has gradually expanded 
over time as the functions of the concept and the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the government have increased. Under a tradi-
tional definition of the concept, a watercourse is navigable if the 
public uses or can use the watercourse, in its ordinary condition, 
for commerce.78 Although the traditional definition still governs 
the allocation of title to submerged beds between federal and state 
governments, it no longer defines the full scope of the federal gov-
ernment's regulatory powers over water resources. 79 Nor does it 
fully define the scope of the public's interests in navigable waters. 
It does not control, for example, the question of the public's water 
use rights under state law. As long as their decisions do not conflict 
with superior federal law, state courts are free to make their own 
determinations of public rights under the navigability concept and 
other theories. 80 
Accordingly, some state c~mrts have expanded the concept of 
navigability to include a functional approach to defining public 
water use rights. These courts have rejected the traditional test as 
the only definition of navigability and have adopted an additional 
test based on recreational or public use.81 Under this new ap-
proach, a watercourse that is not navigable in fact for commercial 
77 See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.02[1], 9.03[1)[a]. See generally id. § 9.04 (discus ... ing 
the navigation servitude). A state navigation servitude may also exist. See id. § 3.17[3). 
•• See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See generally 1A G. Thomp-
son, supra note 13, § 258 (discussing the meaning of navigability). 
79 See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 9.03[1)[b]. See generally id. § 9.03[1][c] (discussing the 
expansion of the federal definition of navigability). Under common law, the states became 
the owners of the beds beneath navigable waters when the American Revolution took place. 
See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.02[3). 
The traditional navigability test generally is used to identify navigable waters for the pur-
pose of determining state ownership of beds. See id. §§ 8.02[1], 8.03[1]. Once state owner-
ship of beds initially is determined, state law then basically governs the allocation of title to 
beds between private parties and the state. See id. §§ 8.03[2], 8.05(1]. 
80 See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.02, 8.05. See generally id. § 9.05 (discussing federal 
preemption of state water law). 
•• See, e.g., Arkansas v. Mcilroy, 268 Ark. 227, 234-37, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663-65, cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P .2d 
163, 169-71 (Mont. 1984); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969). Some jurisdictions 
have rejected the recreational boating test. See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 
P.2d 1025 (1979); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959). See 
generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.05[2) (discussing the recreational use test). 
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purposes may nevertheless be navigable for purposes of recognizing 
recreational and other instream rights if the watercourse may be 
used for those purposes. 82 Courts adopting the recreational use 
definition explain that the navigability concept serves a variety of 
functions and that the meaning of navigability should vary accord-
ingly. Courts explain further that, because the commercial use test 
controls the question of title and developed before recreational 
uses became important, the traditional test should not be inter-
preted to preclude a recreational use approach. 83 
Some commentators have interpreted the recreational use cases 
as public trust decisions rather than as navigability cases having 
independent legal significance. 84 Although the language of a few 
opinions supports this view,811 the two concepts have somewhat dif-
ferent meanings and implications. One important difference is that 
the public trust doctrine is self-executing, while the federal naviga-
tion servitude is not.86 Over one hundred years ago, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the federal navigation servi-
tude did not, by itself, prevent actions that impair navigation. The 
navigation servitude merely authorized Congress to pass legislation 
to protect the federal interest in navigation. But without legisla-
tion, no federal common law existed to protect that interest.87 The 
public trust doctrine, in contrast, does protect the public interest 
in trust resources even in the absence of protective legislation. 
Only a few years after deciding that there was no federal common 
law to protect the navigation servitude, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the trust doctrine-a common law con-
cept-could be used to invalidate state action that impaired the 
82 See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 
1984). 
83 See, e.g., id.; cf. A. Tarlock, supra note 1. § 8.02[1] (discussing the different functions 
of the navigability concept). 
8
' See Ausness, supra note 3, at 434. 
86 See, e.g., Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512, 515 (Miss. 1986) 
(taking a broad approach to public trust purposes and discussing those purposes in the con-
text of the navigability concept), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 
U.S. 469 (1988); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71 
(Mont. 1984) (discussing recreational use in the context of the public trust doctrine and the 
navigability concept). 
88 Walston, supra note 61, at 48. 
87 See Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888). Since that decision, 
Congress has enacted numerous statutes to protect and promote the navigation servitude. 
See generally A. , Tarlock, supra note 1, ch. 9 (discussing federal regulation of water 
resources). 
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public trust.88 Thus, to the extent that courts tie the recreational 
use test to the federal navigation servitude,89 protection of public 
recreational rights would require legislative action. Public recrea-
tional rights based on the public trust doctrine, in contrast, could 
receive judicial protection in the absence of legislative action re-
gardless of the theoretical origins attributed to the doctrine. 
A second difference concerns the scope of the two concepts. As 
explained earlier, some courts have concluded that the public trust 
concept is nonstatic and changes with the times. Because the no-
tion of stewardship is inherent in the public trust doctrine, taking 
a flexible approach to defining the scope of the doctrine permits a 
court to extend the doctrine to new stewardship concerns like eco-
logical preservation and other instream uses. The navigation servi-
tude, in contrast, tends to be less adaptable and more focused in 
scope. Thus, even when a court is willing to extend the definition 
of navigability to include recreational use, it does not necessarily 
follow that the court will define recreational use to include ecologi-
cal values.90 
In conclusion, use of an expanded navigability concept to protect 
instream values appears to suffer more inherent limitations than 
similar use of the public trust doctrine. As long as the public inter-
est is tied to the federal navigation servitude, the protection af-
forded instream uses under the navigability concept will depend on 
legislative action. Furthermore, even if the public interest is inde-
pendent of the navigation servitude, the narrower, more focused 
scope of the navigability concept still may limit the utility of the 
concept in the instream context. Except in the more liberal juris-
dictions, public instream interests will be limited to uses related to 
commercial or recreational navigation . 
. 
88 See Illinois Centraf R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1893). 
89 The United States Supreme Court's early incorporation of the navigability concept into 
the commerce clause would explain such a link. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
State courts are often vague in their descriptions of the origins of public water rights and 
the functions being served by the navigability concept. See, e.g., Montana cases cited infra 
note 156. The courts' vagueness is understandable given the variety of theories supporting 
public rights. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, ch. 8 (discussing the nature, scope, 
and origins of public water use rights) . Additionally, even those states adopting the recrea-
tional use test vary in their approach to public recreational rights. Some courts appear to 
limit public interests to uses necessarily related to recreational navigation, while others rec-
ognize virtually any interest incidental to navigational activity. See infra note 153. 
90 Accord Ausness, supra note 3, at 434-35; cf. infra note 153 (discussing the different 
judicial approaches to recreational use). See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra 
note 35, §§ 5.1, 5.3, 6.3.8 (discussing the philosophical origins and normative implications of 
the public trust doctrine). 
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C. The Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine 
Under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, courts have in-
terpreted government action that withdraws lands from the public 
domain and sets them aside for a particular purpose as reserving 
water to carry out that purpose.91 Depending on the language used 
in the government withdrawal, the courts may base their conclu-
sion on an express or implied intent.92 When an express reserva-
tion exists, the judicial decision is usually simple and straight-
forward.93 Implied intent cases, on the other hand, are more 
controversial, often resulting in disagreement about the legitimacy 
and meaning of implied rights.94 Some recent cases have developed 
a primary, as opposed to secondary, purpose test.95 In Sierra Club 
v. Block,96 for example, a United States district court concluded 
that the federal Wilderness Act impliedly reserved federal water 
rights in previously unappropriated water.97 As the court ex-
plained, Congress intended the protection of watersheds and the 
preservation of water flows to be a primary purpose of the Wilder-
ness Act. Accomplishing this purpose would require the reservation 
of water rights.98 
Decisions like Sierra Club are significant because they legitimate 
certain instream uses that state law might not otherwise protect. 
In addition, under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, pro-
tected instream uses generally acquire priority over state water 
rights at the time when the reservation of federal land occurred, 
not when the water use began. This priority date is earlier than the 
date typically set by state law.99 Although the earlier priority date 
benefits instream uses protected under the reserved water rights 
doctrine, this consequence of the doctrine creates uncertainty for 
existing water users.100 
91 See generally Trelease, Uneasy Federalism - State Water Laws and National Water 
Uses, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 751 (1980). 
90 See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 9.08 (discussing non-Indian federal reserved 
water rights). To the extent that court interpretations reflect an express legislative intent, 
the federal reserved water rights doctrine would more appropriately be characterized as a 
legislative form of instream protection. 
93 See id. § 9.08[2], at 9-49 to -50 (discussing one such example). 
$• See id. at 9-50. 
n See generally id. § 9.08[2) (discussing the implied intent cases). 
98 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). 
97 /d. at 858-62. 
98 /d. 
8 $ See Trelease, supra note 91, at 756. 
100 See id. at 762-63. See generally Trelease, supra note 91 (criticizing the federal re-
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D. Protection Through Judicial Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Provisions 
Some state courts have interpreted generally worded environ-
mental provisions in their state constitutions as imposing a duty of 
environmental protection obligating state officials to consider envi-
ronmental impact.101 In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environ-
mental Control Commission/02 for example, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court interpreted state constitutional and statutory law as 
imposing a duty of environmental protection on all state officials 
and agencies.103 The Louisiana case involved a challenge to an 
agency's decision to issue permits for the construction and opera-
tion of a hazardous waste disposal facility. The Louisiana Consti-
tution has, for years, contained a general environmental provision 
declaring that the "natural resources of the state, including air and 
water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of 
the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished in-
sofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare 
of the people. "104 The provision then authorizes the legislature to 
"enact laws to implement" the provision's policy.106 
Under the court's interpretation, the constitutional provision re-
quired state agencies and officials to determine, prior to approval 
of proposed action, whether "adverse environmental impacts have 
been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with 
the public welfare. " 106 As the court explained, this obligation re-
quired a balancing of environmental costs and benefits with eco-
nomic, social, and other factors. 107 Courts reviewing substantive 
decisions reached through this balancing process were not to re-
verse a decision unless the actual balance reached by the agency 
was "arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental 
protection."108 Because the agency record under review did notre-
veal whether the agency even recognized its constitutional obliga-
served and nonreserved water rights doctrines). 
101 See generally Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence 
and Regulatory Failure, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. , part l.B (1990) (discussing the role of 
environmental provisions in state constitutions). 
102 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984). 
103 Id. at 1154-55, 1156-58. 
10
• La. Canst. art. IX, § 1. 
10. !d. 
108 Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1157. 
107 !d. at 1160. 
108 !d. at 1159. 
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tions, the matter was remanded for further consideration. 
The theory behind a decision like Save Ourselves represents an-
other step in the evolution of public property rights in environ-
mental resources. Agencies are required, in effect, to recognize a 
public interest that the state cannot abridge without providing a 
measure of process. Instream uses that raise environmental preser-
vation concerns theoretically, then, should receive some constitu-
tional protection.109 This movement towards recognition of public 
property rights, however, is limited in the amount of protection it 
actually affords to instream values. In practice, the protection may 
be very superficial and limited given the low standard of judicial 
review. Furthermore, a substantial number of courts have dis-
agreed with the Louisiana court and have refused to interpret gen-
eral environmental provisions in their state constitution as impos-
ing a mandatory duty on state officials.110 In a 1985 decision, for 
example, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a constitu-
tional provision similar in wording to the Louisiana provision did 
not mandate action by state officials. To rule otherwise would, in 
the court's view, raise too many unanswered questions. Thus, ab-
sent legislative direction, the constitutional provision remained a 
nonbinding policy statement.I11 
To summarize, the protective techniques developed through the 
judicial process represent important steps in the evolution of a 
concept of public property rights in environmental resources. Each 
of the techniques has the potential to afford some protection to the 
public's instream needs. At this stage of the evolutionary process, 
however, it is evident that no overriding theory has, as of yet, been 
clearly articulated. Although the techniques help to legitimate the 
public interest in instream use, they, at best, represent scattered 
attempts to protect instream values. Without the development of 
some overriding theory, the judicial techniques will continue to be 
limited in the amount of protection each independently can 
provide. 
109 For a discussion of how courts can enforce environmental provisions in state constitu-
tions even when legislative direction is missing, see Butler, supra note 101, part I.B.2. 
110 See id. part I.B (introductory paragraphs). 
111 Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985). For further discus-
sion of Virginia's approach to its constitutional provision, see Butler, supra note 101, part 
I.B.l. 
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Ill. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES 
In addition to judicial protection, instream uses have received 
statutory protection in a growing number of jurisdictions. Legisla-
tive protection of instream uses takes a number of different forms. 
They include statutory modification of the traditional water alloca-
tion doctrines, minimum flow legislation, and enactment of pro-
grams providing indirect protection for instream values. Each of 
the different forms of legislative protection represents a recogni-
tion of the validity of public interests in water resources. The di-
verse treatment of public interests under the various programs also 
demonstrates, however, that, like judicial techniques, the legisla-
tive programs lack a coherent central theory. 
A. Statutory Modification of the Traditional Allocation 
Doctrines 
Legislatures generally have pursued two key options in modify-
ing their traditional water allocation systems to protect the public 
interest in nonconsumptive uses. These options are direct statu-
tory recognition of instream water rights and the incorporation of a 
public interest standard into the water allocation process. Of the 
two approaches, the first represents a clearer political choice and 
thus should produce more effective protection of the public inter-
est in instream water use. 
1. Recognition of Instream Water Rights 
A number of prior appropriation jurisdictions have modified 
their water rights systems by statutorily recognizing instream 
water rights. In Idaho and Colorado, for example, state agencies 
can obtain the right to appropriate water for instream uses. The 
Idaho legislation identifies waters where instream appropriations 
are allowed, while the Colorado provisions allow an administrative 
agency to make that determination. Both instream programs rec-
ognize the appropriation of water for environmental preservation 
as a beneficial use.112 
m See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 37-92-103(4) (1973 & Supp. 1989); Idaho Code§§ 
67-4301, -4304, -4307 to -4312 (1989). At least one state even allows private parties to make 
instream appropriations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-151 (1987). Some commentators 
have criticized the recognition of private instream appropriations. See, e.g., A. Tarlock, 
supra note 1, § 5.07[3]. 
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These two instream appropriation programs have already faced 
unsuccessful legal challenges.113 In one such challenge, 114 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court upheld statutory provisions allowing the state 
to appropriate such waters of natural streams and lakes as may be 
required "to preserve the .natural environment to a reasonable de-
gree."1111 Opponents of the program had claimed that any instream 
appropriation for recreational and ecological purposes would be in-
valid because of the absence of an actual diversion. They also ar-
gued that the statutory provisions authorizing instream appropria-
tions were constitutionally infirm. In rejecting these arguments, 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that under state law an instream 
appropriation did not need to include an actual diversion and that 
the challenged provisions were not void for vagueness nor other-
wise invalid under the state Constitution. The court explained that 
the state's minimum flow legislation clearly intended appropria-
tions without diversions. 116 In addition, the court noted that the 
presumption of valid agency action "must stand in the absence of 
evidence that there is no rational connection between preservation 
of existing fish species ... by minimum stream flows and preserva-
tion of the natural environment."117 Though the court acknowl-
edged the vagueness of the statutory language, it nevertheless up-
held the delegation of authority to an administrative agency, 
reasoning that the delegated duties involved factual determina-
tions that were within the specific expertise of the agency.118 Any 
other conclusion would, in the court's view, impose an "impossible 
task" on the legislature.119 
Recognition and acquisition of instream water rights is especially 
significant in prior appropriation jurisdictions. As the Colorado de-
cision demonstrates, such recognition generally means that a court 
will accept the legitimacy of the instream right. Though statutory 
recognition of instream water rights clearly does not prevent chal-
lenges by private rights holders upset by the change in law, such 
113 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation 
Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979); Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96 
Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). 
114 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 594 
P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979). 
110 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 37-92-103(4) (1973 & Supp. 1989). 
116 Colorado River Water, o94 P.2d at 574. 
111 /d. at 577. The Board had assumed that maintenance of adequate wildlife through 
minimum flows would promote environmental preservation. /d. 
m I d. at 57 5-76. 
m /d. at 576. 
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recognition does facilitate the judiciary's task of resolving the chal-
lenges. In addition, once the instream right is acquired, the holder 
gains priority over subsequent rights. Indeed, even when the in-
stream right is junior to other water rights, the holder of the in-
stream right retains the power to stop certain changes in stream 
conditions that would damage that right.120 
2. The Public Interest Standard 
Legislatures in both riparian and appropriation jurisdictions 
have modified their common law water allocation systems to in-
clude a public interest component. In some jurisdictions that com-
ponent is incorporated directly into the water allocation process, 
while in others it appears in key definitional provisions. For the 
most part, prior appropriation jurisdictions seem to have been 
more aggressive in using the public interest legislation to protect 
instream use. 
Although the extent of the legislative changes in riparian juris-
dictions varies significantly from state to state, many of the stat-
utes enable administrative agencies to consider the public interest 
in regulating water users.I21 Florida, for example, has enacted com-
prehensive water reforms which require development of a state 
water use plan incorporating economic and environmental consid-
erations.122 Virginia, although not adopting comprehensive re-
forms, has also enacted statutory provisions recognizing the legiti-
macy of environmental values. One 1989 enactment of particular 
"" See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.08[1], 5.17[3][a]; Ausness, supra note 3, at 429-30. A 
junior appropriator generally "has the right to the continuation of stream conditions as they 
existed" at the time of his appropriation and can object to "all changes in the point of 
diversion or place of use." A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.17[3][a], at 5-71. 
'"' For a discussion of water reforms in eastern states, see Ausness, Water Rights Legisla-
tion in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 547 (1983). Many of these 
reforms appear to be based on the Model Water Code, which sets forth a comprehensive 
permit system for allocating water rights. Among other provisions, the Model Water Code 
declares ecological, recreational, and scenic values to be " in the public interest." A Model 
Water Code § 1.02(3) (F. Maloney, R. Ausness & J. Morris 1972) [hereinafter cited as Model 
Water Code]. Public interest criteria, in turn, are relevant to the permit issuance process. 
Id. § 2.02(1). Although the Model Water Code also provides for the establishment of mini-
mum flow levels, see id. § 1.07(4)-(5), some riparian jurisdictions appear to have ignored this 
provision in modifying their water allocation systems. Until recently, Virginia was one of 
those jurisdictions. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. See generally Hayes & 
Watson, Stream Flow Maintenance in Virginia, 18 U. Rich. L. Rev. 485 (1984) (discussing 
instream protection under Virginia law). 
ua See Fla. Stat. § 373.036 (1987); see also id. ch. 373 (1987 & Supp. 1989) (setting forth 
comprehensive reforms for water resources). 
1990] Environmental Water Rights 347 
significance refocuses the riparian doctrine's reasonable use re-
quirement by defining "beneficial use" to include "both instream 
and offstream uses," with instream uses entailing "the protection 
of fish and wildlife habitat, maintenance of waste assimilation, rec-
reation, navigation, and cultural and aesthetic values."123 The en-
actment also recognizes the importance of protecting beneficial in-
stream uses. 124 
Many prior appropriation states also have modified their com-
mon law systems to allow consideration of the public interest in 
the water allocation process. The public interest provisions typi-
cally are found in comprehensive statutory permit schemes and are 
but one of several factors affecting water allocation decisions! 215 Al-
though these states have not traditionally defined the public inter-
est to include environmental values, the states are beginning to ex-
pand the concept to include such values.126 In some jurisdictions 
this expansion is occurring through the legislative process. Utah, 
for instance, has a statutory provision that authorizes the state en-
gineer to reject an appropriation request if it would "unreasonably 
affect public recreation or the natural stream environment" or the 
public welfare.127 In other jurisdictions the expansion is . being 
achieved through broad judicial interpretation of general public in-
terest legislation. In the 1985 decision Shokal v. Dunn, for exam-
ple, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the statutory duty to 
protect the public interest as including consideration of stream en-
vironment, wildlife, recreation, aesthetics, and other related val-
ues.128 The court justified its broad interpretation by pointing to a 
related statutory provision generally declaring environmental val-
ues to be in the public interest. 129 
In applying the public interest standard, states either adopt a 
rebuttable presumption about the minimum flow needed to pre-
serve instream values or take a case-by-case approach. Under the 
rebuttable presumption approach, the appropriate administrative 
123 Act of Mar. 20, 1989, ch. 410, 1989 Va. Acts 584, 584 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-
10(b) (Supp. 1989)). 
124 /d., 1989 Va. Acts 584, 585 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-ll(F) (Supp. 1989)). 
120 See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.12-.13 (discussing the western permit 
systems and the public interest limitation). 
••• See id. § 5.13[1]. 
127 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1) (1989); see also Cal. Water Code §§ 1253, 1255-1257.5 
(West 1971 & Supp. 1990) (providing for consideration of beneficial use, including instream 
use, and for rejection of applications not in the public interest). 
••• 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985). 
129 /d. at 337-38, 707 P.2d at 448-49. 
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agency determines in advance the minimum flow needed to protect 
instream values in a particular stream or river. Permit applicants 
seeking a reduction in that flow then must establish that the re-
duction would be in the public interest. The case-by-case ap-
proach, in contrast, requires the appropriate agency to determine 
instream flow needs for each water rights application.130 
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The re-
buttable presumption approach, for example, tends to cause signif-
icant controversy while the minimum flow level is being set. After 
that decision is made, however, the approach helps to facilitate the 
permit process for most projects and thus to reduce the strain on 
administrative resources.lSl The case-by-case approach, on the 
other hand, diffuses controversy surrounding the setting of mini-
mum flows. State agencies following that approach, however, tend 
to face a prolonged permitting process, for they generally have to 
consider the mm1mum flow issue for each water rights 
application.132 
B. Minimum Flow Statutes 
A growing number of states have enacted legislation protecting 
minimum flows. This legislation comes in a variety of forms, in-
cluding withdrawal programs, reservation provisions, and mini-
mum or preservation flow programs. 
1. Withdrawal and Reservation Programs 
Some types of withdrawal legislation expressly authorize the 
withdrawal of water from further appropriation.133 Other types 
provide for the suspension of proposed appropriations pending a 
determination of their impact on existing rights and on the public 
good.134 All versions result in affirmative protection of instream 
uses. 
Virtually identical in effect to withdrawal provisions, reservation 
programs set up a process for reserving water for a variety of pur-
poses, including instream purposes. Montana law, for instance, au-
130 Lamb, Predicting the Results of Instream Flow Policies, in Water for the 21st Cen-
tury: Will It be There? 840, 842 (M. Collins ed. 1984). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 842-43. 
139 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.410, 538.110-.300 (1989). 
184 See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-601 to 85-2-608 (1989); Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-6-1 
to 73-6-2 (1989). 
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thorizes reservations by government officials for "existing or future 
beneficial uses," including "agricultural, municipal, and minimum 
flow purposes for the protection of existing rights and aquatic 
life."136 To obtain a reservation, an applicant has to establish the 
purpose and need for the reservation, the quantity of water to be 
reserved, and consistency with the public interest.136 Reservation 
programs typically enable a state agency to grant variances and 
require periodic review of reserved flows. 137 
In practice, instream reservations can have the same. effect as 
recognition of instream water rights. Under the prior appropriation 
system, the reservations would acquire a priority over subsequently 
acquired water rights. Further, in a riparian jurisdiction, the in-
stream reservation would be treated as a preferred riparian use. 
The variance and periodic review features of reservation programs, 
however, differentiate the programs from the more direct approach 
of recognizing instream water rights, making the reservation pro-
grams potentially weaker.138 
2. Minimum or Preservation Flow Programs 
Taking a slightly different approach from the withdrawal and 
reservation programs, numerous states have enacted specific provi-
sions authorizing the setting of minimum or preservation flow 
levels for watercourses. These programs typically provide for the 
prohibition or the cessation of uses that interfere with the estab-
lished flow levels.139 Several different approaches are used to estab-
lish minimum flows. Some jurisdictions follow an ecological ap-
proach, defining the minimum flow to be the level required to 
sustain fish, vegetation, and other aquatic wildlife. Others take a 
broader approach, directing agencies to consider recreational and 
aesthetic interests as well. 140 
In recent years a few states have enacted more comprehensive 
130 Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-316(1), 85-2-605 (1989). 
136 !d. § 85-2-316(4)(a). 
137 See Lamb, supra note 130, at 844. 
138 See id. 
138 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-141b, -141c (West 1975 & Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat. 
§§ 373.036(7), .042, .044 (1988); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 51-3-7, 51-3-55 (Supp. 1989). But see 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.235, .310(7), .310(13), .325 (1989) (providing for the establishment of 
minimum flows but explicitly preferring human consumption needs). 
140 See Ausness, supra note 3, at 432. See generally Lamb, Quantifying lnstream Flows: 
Matching Policy and Technology, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 23-39 (L. 
MacDonnell, T . Rice & S. Shupe eds. 1989) (discussing instream assessment policy and 
technology). 
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legislation to preserve instream flows. Recent Virginia legislation, 
for example, establishes a low flow permitting system.141 The stat-
ute authorizes the State Water Control Board to declare an area to 
be a surface water management area when the Board determines 
that the area has substantial instream values, that low flow condi-
tions and offstream uses could threaten those values, and that the 
public welfare, health, and safety require regulation.142 After such 
a declaration is made, no party in the area may withdraw surface 
water, unless otherwise exempted, without a withdrawal permit.143 
During periods of low flow, permittees may become subject to cer-
tain permit conditions designed to protect beneficial instream 
uses. 144 This type of legislation overcomes some of the weaknesses 
of the more specific mandates to establish minimum flows. By es-
tablishing a comprehensive and flexible administrative structure 
for protecting important instream values during periods of low 
flow, the Virginia General Assembly has avoided some of the 
problems caused by broad-based statutory exceptions and inflexi-
ble legislative determinations of regulatory need.1411 
C. Statutes Indirectly Protecting Instream Values 
In addition to direct protection of instream values, legislatures 
have also adopted indirect forms of protection. Several states, for 
example, have enacted environmental policy acts that have been 
interpreted as imposing an affirmative obligation on state agencies 
to consider environmental factors. The Louisiana decision dis-
cussed earlier demonstrates this point. In that decision, the court 
interpreted the state's Environmental Affairs Act as imposing a 
duty of environmental protection in conjunction with the constitu-
tional provisions. 148 Many states have also followed the example of 
the federal government in enacting legislation to protect wild and 
"' Act of Apr. 5, 1989, ch. 721, 1989 Va. Acts 1697 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-242 
to -253 (Supp. 1989)). 
142 Va. Code Ann. § 62.1·246 (Supp. 1989). 
143 ld. § 62.1-247. 
144 ld. § 62.1-248. 
,.. Whether these advantages actually result in greater instream protection remains to be 
seen. The State Water Control Board currently is in the process of adopting regulations to 
implement the low ftow statute. See State Water Control Board, Notice of Intended Regula-
tory Action, in 6 Va. Register of Regulations, issue 4, at 656 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
148 See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 
1152, 1154-55, 1156-57 (La. 1984). For a discussion of the most significant environmental 
policy act, the National Environmental Policy Act, see 1 Law of Environmental Protection 
ch. 9 (S. Novick, D. Stever & M. Mellon eds. 1989). 
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scenic rivers. Because these statutes restrict access to protected 
rivers, they indirectly protect instream values.147 Finally, some 
states protect instream flow through legislation regulating dam 
construction and operation. 148 
In conclusion, like its judicial counterpart, legislative protection 
of instream use also represents an important but limited step in 
the evolution of public property rights in environmental resources. 
Although the legislative forms of protection tend to be more com-
prehensive and specific than the judicial techniques, the legislative 
devices also suffer from numerous limitations and problems. For 
the most part, these weaknesses reflect the need for an overriding 
theory or concept of public rights. Part IV explores one such the-
ory: the public property concept. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS AND THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC 
PROPERTY 
The discussion of the protectionist movement for instream uses 
clearly demonstrates that the law is gradually recognizing and ac-
commodating the public interest in environmental uses ·of water 
resources. Yet to be established, however, is the actual or appropri-
ate direction of this evolutionary process under the law. Of partic-
ular concern is the relationship of the newly protected public inter-
est in instream use to private property rights. Because the public 
interest being recognized under the protectionist movement exists 
in resources that traditionally have been .subject to a private allo-
cation system, the emerging public interest is sure to have an ad-
verse effect on private rights. As the demand for water resources 
rises, 149 conflicts between public and private interests will become 
increasingly common. Unless the evolutionary process provides a 
principled system for resolving those conflicts, they will, over time, 
escalate into angry confrontations and protracted legal disputes. 
Effective use of such a valuable and scarce resource as water, in 
other words, requires a balanced and fair conflict resolution 
system. 
147 See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-1287 (West 1985 & Supp. 
1989); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5093.50-.69 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 
146.200-.360 (1987); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 46A-1-15 to 46A-1-16 (1987); Lamb, supra 
note 130, at 845. 
148 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 401-407 (Supp. 1989); see also Ausness, supra 
note 3, at 433. . 
149 For authorities discussing America's increasing demand for water, see supra note 1. 
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Current devices developed to protect public instream uses gener-
ally do not provide for such a conflict resolution system. For the 
most part, the protective devices serve a limited function: to estab-
lish· the basic legitimacy of the public interest in environmental 
water uses. Little, if any, guidance is provided on the nature of the 
public interest, the level of protection owed to that interest, or the 
impact on private rights.150 Nor do the devices attempt to provide 
a unified, consistent, or coherent approach to instream use protec-
tion. While some forms of protection focus on navigation-related 
uses, others take an ecological perspective. Still others follow a 
broad-based approach, protecting recreational, ecological, and aes-
thetic uses.161 Similar variety exists in the allocation of decision-
making responsibility. In some jurisdictions protection of instream 
uses arises from judicial declarations, while in others primary 
responsibility rests with the legislative and administrative 
branches.1112 
' Judicial devices like the expansive readings of the navigability 
concept and the public trust doctrine demonstrate the limited use-
fulness of current forms of protection. The recreational use test for 
navigability, for example, simply provides a judicial basis for rec-
ognizing certain public recreational interests under the navigability 
concept. Unless a public purpose is related to recreational use, the 
purpose probably will not merit protection under the test. 1113 Addi-
tionally, as a judicial interpretation of the navigability concept, 
100 Some might argue that sufficient guidance has been provided in prior appropriation 
jurisdictions that have statutorily modified their water rights systems to recognize instream 
appropriations. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. As part of the prior appropria-
tion system, an instream appropriation would be subject to the same priority rules that 
govern traditional water uses. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. But as recent 
challenges to those.statutory amendments demonstrate, the incorporation of instream uses 
into the prior appropriation system is far from clear. See supra notes 113-19 and accompa-
nying text. 
101 See, e.g., supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
••• See, e.g., supra notes 44-57, 112, 135-37 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Some courts appear to limit public recrea-
tional interests to uses involving recreational navigation. See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 
835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); see also A. Tarlock, 
supra note 1, § 8.05[2], at 8-29 to -30 (discussing judicial use of the pleasure boat test). But 
cf. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 363, 528 P.2d 
1295, 1298 (1974) (recognizing a broad category of recreational uses when a stream is physi-
cally navigable by small craft); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 
(1893) (suggesting a broader approach to recreational use). To the extent that recreational 
rights are not limited to n~vigational activities, serious legal problems could arise. Cf. A. 
Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.05[3] (discussing the constitutionality of liberal navigability 
tests). 
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public recreational rights appear to be limited in scope. Once a 
watercourse loses the ability to sustain recreational use under nor-
mal conditions, public rights would seem to end.1114 Furthermore, 
as a general matter, courts have tended to protect public recrea-
tional rights only in situations involving private action designed 
primarily to prevent or interfere with public use.156 With a few 
possible exceptions, the rights do not appear to include the power 
to prevent indirect or unintentional interference with public recre-
ational use resulting from the exercise of traditionally recognized 
water rights. 156 Though the public trust doctrine clearly has the 
••• Cf. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 
1984) ("capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines whether the 
waters can be so used"); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 
170 (Mont. 1984) (recreational capability is the key); cf. also A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 
8.05[2) (discussing the recreational capacity test). 
'"" See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) (where the court or-
dered a private waterfront landowner to desist in efforts to block passage down adjoining 
stream); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984) 
(where the court enjoined a private waterfront landowner from installing a fence to block 
public use); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) 
(where the court protected public recreational use against interference and harassment by a 
private waterfront landowner); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 
(1955) (where the court granted an injunction requiring the removal of steel cables and a 
wire fence built by waterfront landowners to block other riparians' use of a stream). Quite a 
few of the decisions involve trespassing claims by private waterfront landowners or declara-
tory judgment requests by members of the public. Typically a private landowner has as-
serted exclusive use rights in water flowing past his land and has denied even the existence 
of a right of passage in the public. See, e.g. , Arkansas v. Mcilroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 
659, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Live-
stock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley 
Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); Day v. 
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). 
106 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. But cf. State ex rel. Brown v. Newport 
Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975) (where the court ordered the 
removal of a concrete structure built by a waterfront landowner for a purpose that is not 
clearly a traditional water right-the creation of a crossing for the landowner's trucks). 
The courts are somewhat inconsistent, though, i~ describing the nature of public recrea-
tional rights. Some Montana courts, for example, have suggested that private water rights 
sometimes are superior to public recreational rights. See Montana Coalition for Stream Ac-
cess, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Mont. 1984) (appearing to accommodate the 
wharf rights of private waterfront landowners by recognizing a very limited public right to 
portage around barriers); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 
163, 170, 172 (Mont. 1984) (apparently making a similar accommodation, as well as recog-
nizing the private landowner's superior right to appropriate for irrigation purposes). But 
then, in recognizing the existence of public recreational rights, the courts sometimes broadly 
state that private parties cannot interfere with the public rights. See, e.g., id. at 170. The 
inconsistency may be due, in part, to the overlapping origins. of public recreational rights. In 
Montana, for example, the navigability concept, public trust doctrine, and state Constitu-
tion all appear to play a role. See id. at 169-71. 
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capability of providing more meaningful protection, 1117 judicial use 
of the doctrine to protect instream use raises many unanswered 
questions. As noted earlier, those questions include the criteria to 
be used in defining the scope of the public trust interest in in-
stream use, as well as the relationship of that interest to the pri-
vate water rights system.1118 
Legislative forms of protection suffer from similar limitations. 
Some statutory devices, for example, are nothing more than vague 
policy statements, committing to instream use protection in gen-
eral terms only. 159 These devices often recognize the importance of 
instream use protection, but then fail to provide for implementa-
tion of a specific instream use program.160 Other legislative provi-
sions represent a clear commitment to environmental water uses, 
typically authorizing a particular state agency or official to pro-
mote instream values.161 With some exceptions, though, these pro-
visions tend to be narrow or restrained in scope. They, for exam-
ple, may limit instream appropriations to particular waters162 or 
provide for a case-by-case determination of instream flow needs.163 
Furthermore, even when a relatively strong legislative commitment 
exists, it often is weakened by statutory exceptions16" or by provi-
sions permitting variances. 1M Few, if any, of the legislative devices 
provide sufficient guidance on the nature and scope of public envi-
ronmental water rights and on their relationship with private 
rights.166 
167 See supra notes 84·90 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the implica-
tions of the public trust doctrine for environmental regulation, see Butler, supra note 101, 
part liLA. 
168 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
,.. See, e.g., supra notes 123-29, 133-34 and accompanying text. 
160 See generally supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing the public inter-
est legislation in prior appropriation states). 
161 See, e.g., supra notes 112, 135-37, 141-45 and accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text (Idaho legislation). 
168 See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text (Colorado ·legislation). 
16
' See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-243 (1989). 
166 See, e.g., supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
188 Although legislation does not have to-and arguably should not-provide detailed 
guidance to regulators, legislation still must define basic policies and standards in order for 
implementation to be responsive and effective. Statutory forms of instream protection vary 
in their effectiveness in providing guidance. Legislation protecting instream values in desig-
nated waters probably is as specific as any instream legislation. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code §§ 5093.50-.69 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 146.200-.360 (1987). But 
even that legislation does not always provide specific guidance on the relationship of in-
stream uses to private land uses. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5093.546, .58 (West 1984 & 
Supp. 1990). But see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 146.290 (1987) (defining land uses permitted in in-
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For the evolutionary process to be complete, lawmakers must 
move beyond the legitimation stage and provide some content to 
the public interest in instream use. Current protective devices re-
present an important first step in the evolution of public environ-
mental water rights: they reflect growing acceptance of instream 
values in a wide array of legal arenas and thus make significant 
strides in establishing the legitimacy of the public interest in in-
stream use. But while current devices have opened the door for 
public instream uses, they have not provided a principled or coher-
ent body of law to govern the emerging public interest, especially 
its relationship with other interests. In addition to legitimation, 
the evolutionary process must find an effective way to integrate the 
new concept of public environmental water rights into the estab-
lished legal system. Among other topics, this integration process 
must address the issue of conflict resolution, for standards and pol-
icies definitely will be needed to guide public and private parties in 
the exercise of their rights and courts and regulators in the admin-
istration of the water rights system. 
Application of the public property concept to environmental 
water uses would move the evolutionary process from the legitima-
tion to the integration stage. As the following discussion will ex-
plain, the public property concept is a natural and necessary com-
plement to the private rights system. Though use of the public 
property concept runs contrary to the normal preference for pri-
vate property rights, the utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifica-
tions supporting the private rights system sometimes require pub-
lic rights instead. By identifying when these justifications support 
public, as opposed to private, rights, lawmakers can provide a basis 
for defining the nature and extent of public instream uses and for 
resolving conflicts between public and private interests. Many in-
stream uses, with their site-specific nature, their positive societal 
stream area). On the surface at least, prior appropriation legislation recognizing instream 
water rights also would appear to be effective in providing guidance. By extending the ap-
propriation doctrine to include instream values, this form of legislation has incorporated 
instream use into the traditional priority system governing water appropriations. But as 
recent challenges to the instream water rights legislation suggest, the implications of the 
extension are not clear nor well-accepted. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
One step in the right direction is the recently enacted Virginia low flow statute. That 
legislation overlays instream use protection on the private water rights system, making in-
stream protection an obligation of nonexempt parties holding withdrawal permits. The ef-
fectiveness of the statute is not yet clear, though, for the state agency charged with respon-
sibility under the statute is currently developing regulations to implement the statute. See 
supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. 
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effects, and their value-generating tendencies, seem especially 
suited to the public property concept. Recognizing appropriate in-
stream uses as public property thus will serve the valuable func-
tion of integrating emerging public interests into more traditional 
law. 
A. Public Property as a Necessary Complement to Private 
Property 
Virtually since the time of the first English settlement, America 
has relied on a private property system to allocate rights and inter-
ests in most of its natural resources. 167 By now, the economic argu-
ments for a private property system are both well-known and well-
accepted. Valuable resources must be privately owned to encourage 
parties to engage in productive activities. Without private owner-
ship rights, a user would have no incentive to invest in the long-
term use of resources, not even if it was more efficient than short-
term use. Absent a private ownership interest, the user would not 
be guaranteed a return on her investment. Third parties who did 
not contribute to the resource's development would be able to cap-
ture the profit from that development without fear of reprisal 
through the property system. Because the user would not be able 
to seek judicial protection of her expectancy, she eventually would 
pursue other uses requiring less investment and providing a 
quicker, but lower, return.168 
Noneconomic justifications for private property rights also are 
well-known, though perhaps not as well-accepted. According to one 
commentator's view, our private property system is the product of 
167 A private rights system appeared as early as 1616 in Virginia. Although King James I 
had authorized private land distribution when he issued the first two charters for the coloni-
zation of Virginia, the patentees initially preferred to hold land in a communal-type ar-
rangement for the general benefit of the colonists. Eventually the patentees realized that 
this arrangement was stymieing growth, and they then authorized private land distribution. 
L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 8.1, at 245. 
••• See R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.1; see also Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: 
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 711-12 (1986). 
Posner's well-known example of a farmer planting corn demonstrates the arguments for pri-
vate property. He writes: 
Imagine a society in which all property rights have been abolished. A farmer plants 
corn, fertilizes it, and erects scarecrows, but when the corn is ripe his neighbor reaps 
and sells it. The farmer has no legal remedy against his neighbor's conduct since he 
owns neither the land that he sowed nor the crop. After a few such incidents the 
cultivation of land will be abandoned and the society will shift to methods of subsis-
tence (such as hunting) that involve less preparatory investment. 
R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.1, at 27 (footnotes omitted). 
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the Lockean theory of government adopted by the framers of the 
Constitution.169 Under a Lockean political structure, individuals 
give up their right to use force in exchange for the right to keep 
the surplus gains resulting from the formation of the govern-
ment.170 Private parties generally are allowed to keep the fruits of 
their labor-that is, their expectation of gain from the use of prop-
erty-as long as the profits are not obtained by force or to the total 
exclusion of others. 171 According to another commentator, private 
property provides a necessary basis for civil liberties.172 Without 
private property, an individual would not be adequately protected 
from government exploitation and aggression. Because such an in-
dividual would be dependent on government for all necessities, he 
would be an easy target for majoritarian exploitation. Private 
property thus provides the individual with a "zone of privacy," en-
abling him to move freely and without fear of government 
reprisal. 173 
Despite the economic and political arguments for private prop-
erty rights, some public property rights do indeed exist. The con-
cept of public property, very generally speaking, involves resources 
not held exclusively by private parties, but rather open to the pub-
lic. To the extent, then, that public property rights exist in a re-
source, private entitlements in that resource are necessarily lim-
ited. At the very least, private parties lose the right of exclusivity, 
and if the public right is strong enough, private parties may even 
find they lack an ownership interest.174 
169 See R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 13-16. 
170 See id. at 9-10, 12-15. See generally J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government 
(1976) (discussing, among other topics, the state of nature, property, and political or civil 
society). 
171 See R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 10-11. 
172 Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 771-72 (1964). 
173 Id. at 771, 778. For more of Reich's views on the relationship between property, civil 
liberties, and the modern welfare state, see id. at 771-77. 
m Examples of traditionally recognized public property concepts include the public trust 
doctrine and the commons concept. As explained earlier, under the public trust doctrine, 
government holds certain resources, principally navigable waters and their beds, in trust for 
the benefit of the public. Although the nature of the public's trust interest varies according 
to the jurisdiction, it typically includes a use right in trust resources. See supra notes 35-43 
and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, those resources may even be privately owned. 
See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, ch. 5 (discussing the public trust 
doctrine). 
Though similar in scope, the commons concept does not impose any trust responsibilities" 
on government, but rather recognizes interests in the public at large. During the early devel-
opment of the concept in England, common rights generally existed in arable lands and 
entitled the rightholders, or the commoners, to make certain defined uses like pasturage and 
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Traditionally lawmakers and commentators have recognized 
public property rights in one of two situations. The first situation, 
sometimes called the plenteous goods exception, involves resources 
that are so abundant or unbounded it is not worthwhile to create a 
private allocation system. The costs of such an effort would out-
weigh any benefits derived from privatization.176 Resources typi-
cally included in this category are the oceans and air.176 
The second situation, sometimes referred to as the public goods 
exception, involves resources for which the private market system 
predictably fails to produce socially optimal uses.177 Although pri-
vate agreements among resource owners could cure some of these 
market failures, the costs of private negotiation are high. Further, 
where a large number of resource owners are involved, collective 
agreements may be impossible. Government ownership and control 
thus are needed in the public goods situation to correct the mar-
ket's inefficiencies and achieve an optimal allocation of 
resources. 178 
Such a situation would exist, for example, when many people 
want to use a resource, like the national forests, but their numbers 
timber-cutting. Although a common right of fishing also existed, the main function of the 
English commons concept was to promote agricultural uses. The American version, in con-
trast, focuses primarily on coastal waters and lands. In addition to the common uses of 
fishing, fowling, and hunting, the American version also can involve an ownership interest. 
See generally id. ch. 6 (discussing the development of the commons concept). 
For further examples of traditional public property theories, see Rose, supra note 168, at 
713-14, 723-49. 
,.. Rose, supra note 168, at 717. 
178 /d. at 717-18. 
117 Scholars have defined the phrase "public goods" in a variety of ways. Some, for exam-
ple, focus generally on the existence of free riders. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 65, § 16.4, 
at 351 & n.4 ("A public good is simply a good the provision of which involves free-rider 
problems."). Others tie the definition of "public goods" more specifically to the existence of 
free riders who can benefit at no additional cost to anyone else. See, e.g., H. Manne, The 
Ecpnomics of Legal Relationships 353 (1975) ("The public goods problem arises because 
certain kinds of economic goods, once produced, can be enjoyed by individuals for whom 
they have positive value at zero marginal cost."), Still others use the phrase "public goods" 
to refer to any resource that should not, under economic theory, be privately owned. SeeR. 
Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 112 (1988). In contrast to the textual approach, some 
of these other definitions would include plenteous goods. See id.; cf. Demsetz, The Ex-
change and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & Econ. 11, 19-20 (1964) (recognizing 
the plenteous goods situation as a public goods problem). 
"" Rose, supra note 168, at 718-19; see also id. at 719-20 (discussing four caveats that 
apply to this conclusion). See generally H. Manne, supra note 177, at 351-480 (setting forth 
readings on public goods, collective goods, and externalities). But cf. Demsetz, supra note 
177, at 19-20 (arguing that efficiency concerns justify excluding free riders even in most 
public goods situations). 
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are too high and their individual interests are too diffused and 
small for their needs to be met by marketplace transactions.179 Or 
a public goods situation would arise when use of a resource, }ike 
railroads or bridges, involves economies of scale.180 When such a 
production condition exists, the average cost of production de-
creases as the level of output increases, making it advantageous to 
have only one firm producing the good. To ensure the realization of 
these advantages, government needs to become the manager of the 
resource. 181 
Some scholars would further limit the definition of public goods 
to resources having two related characteris,tics. First, the resource 
would have to involve "non-rivalrous consumption"-that is, 
resource consumption by one person would not reduce the amount 
available to other persons. 182 Second, the costs of excluding 
nonpaying consumers of the resource would need to be too high for 
any party seeking profit-maximization to pursue production of the 
resource. 183 This definition excludes some situations meeting the 
more general definition. Some resources involving economies of 
scale, for example, would not qualify as public goods. Although 
government management still might be needed to correct the mar-
ket failure surrounding these resources, the non-rivalrous con-
sumption characteristic would not necessarily exist. At some point, 
in~reased consumption would reduce the amount available to 
others; high demand for a bridge during rush hour, for instance, 
would preclude some from using the bridge. 
The plenteous resources and public goods situations represent 
exceptions to the private property regime. In both instances, rights 
of ownership or control are awarded to the government, or the or-
ganized state, as the representative of the public interest in the 
170 See Rose, supra note 168, at 719; cf. Stroup & Baden, Externality, Property Rights, 
and the Management of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & Econ. 303, 306-09 (1973) (present-
ing the arguments against market management of our national forests). 
180 Rose, supra note 168, at 719. 
181 R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 177, at 38-39; Rose, supra note 168, at 766-67. 
182 R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 177, at 46. 
,.. /d. Cooter and Ulen identify the national defense as an example of a good meeting 
their two-part test. They explain: 
!d. 
Consider the conventional example of a public good: national defense. The fact that 
one citizen is secure from the threat of invasion by a foreign army does not leave any 
less security for other citizens. Furthermore, it is difficult to exclude any citizen from 
enjoying the security provided to others. Because of these two characteristics, public 
goods are not likely to be provided at all by the market, or if they are privately pro-
vided, provided in less than socially optimal amounts. 
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regulated resource. To these two exceptions, Professor Carol Rose 
would add a third that recognizes property rights in the unorgan-
ized public. Calling this exception the "inherently public property" 
situation, Professor Rose explains that the two traditional catego-
ries "do not logically exhaust all the possible solutions" to the mar-
ket failure problem; nor do they adequately explain all of the pub-
lic rights theories that have developed under the common law.184 
In addition to the legal developments that have recognized prop-
erty rights in the organized public, there also are doctrines that 
seem to place property interests in the public at large-interests 
that are collectively shared by society and thus independent of any 
interest existing in a government manager.186 Justification for this 
last category of public property is derived from the realization that 
government management, like private management, can pose "dif-
ficult problems," including high management costs and ill-advised, 
politically motivated redistributions.186 Recognizing property rights 
in the unorganized public can, in appropriate situations, result in 
what Professor Rose labels the "comedy of the commons"-that is, 
in a comedic or happy result producing infinitely expanding wealth 
and positive socialization effects. 187 
Under this theory, two key criteria serve as the basis for identi-
fying inherently public property. One criterion, the holdout factor, 
concerns a resource's potential for private economic exploitation of 
the public interest. Because of the inherent nature of certain re-
sources, the public sometimes develops a particularly strong de-
mand or need for a resource and may even begin to express its 
interest informally through a pattern of use.188 In the absence of 
public property rights, such a resource could become subject to the 
private holdout power. That is, if market transactions were allowed 
to occur, the private resource owner could "hold out" for an exor-
bitantly high price, demanding "rent" from the public far in excess 
of fair market value. Too high a price, in turn, may block fulfill-
ment of important public projects or needs.189 The public's clear 
demand for a resource thus creates the opportunity for private 
rent-seeking behavior. Avoiding this behavior requires recognition 
of public rights in the resource. 
184 Rose, supra note 168, at 720. 
•u Id. 
18a Id. 
187 Id. at 723. 
188 See id. at 760-61. 
189 Id. at 749-50. The holdout problem is the rationale for the eminent domain power. ld. 
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The second criterion, described alternately as the publicness or 
relative value test, concerns the public's contribution to the value 
of a resource. When inherently public property is involved, increas· 
ing public use of a resource enhances, rather than diminishes, its 
value. Due to nonexclusive, open-ended public access to the re-
source, increasing returns to scale result: the greater the public 
participation, the larger the rate of return. The public, in other 
words, deserves a property right in the resource because public· 
ness-or nonexclusive, open-ended public use-has created the 
property's highest value.190 
Rose offers several examples of resources meeting the two crite-
ria for inherently public property. One of the examples concerns 
navigable waterways.191 She justifies traditional caselaw· recogniz-
ing the public's superior right of navigation192 by explaining that 
navigable watercourses involve both the holdout problem and the 
publicness factor. Absent recognition of a public right of naviga-
tion, private waterfront landowners could demand prohibitively 
high prices from the public for the right to pass through their sec· 
tion of a watercourse.193 Though this factor is not sufficient, by it· 
self, to justify the existence of public property rights, 194 waterways 
also present the classic example of publicness and thus of increas-
ing returns to scale. Nonexclusive, open-ended public navigation of 
waterways, in other words, produces the property's highest value: 
the more people participating in navigation, the greater the oppor-
tunities for commerce and trade and the larger the increase in 
wealth and productivity.191j 
Expansion of the concept of public property to include interests 
in the unorganized public is appealing because of its economic jus· 
tifications. The criteria that Rose develops to define inherently 
public property continue the economic exploitation theme of the 
traditional public property categories. Requiring a holdout situa-
tion ensures that the third category-inherently public prop-
190 ld. at 768-71. 
191 The other examples involve the public interest in roadways and customary claims. See 
generally id. at 750-53, 758-61 (discussing the examples). 
,.. For her discussion of the traditional caselaw, see id. at 727-30, 735-39. 
193 See id. at 753-54; see also id. at 753-58 (discussing the dangers of private monopoliza-
tion of waterways). 
194 See id. at 770-71. The holdout factor is a necessary, but not a sufficient, reason be-
cause it does not guarantee that public use will be more valuable than private use. /d. at 
761. 
••• ld. at 764-66, 769-70. 
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erty-also focuses on the problem of market failure. Similarly, re-
quiring the publicness of a resource to create its highest value 
guarantees that inherently public property promotes socially opti-
mal uses. Under these criteria, then, inherently public property be-
comes, with the help of modern economic thought, a natural and 
logical extension of the traditional public property concept. 
Rose's criteria for inherently public property may be too strict, 
though. Not all of the justifications that she offers for her criteria 
are economic. Yet when she actually defines the criteria, she seems 
to retreat unnecessarily to economic principles. Her discussion of 
the publicness or relative value test demonstrates this point. In ex-
plaining why the public should acquire a property right in re-
sources meeting this criterion, Rose stresses that the public "de-
serve[s]" the right "because 'publicness,' nonexclusive open access, 
create[s] ... [the property's] highest value."196 The apparent sug-
gestion is that the public would not deserve a right if publicness 
did not create the highest value for a resource. Yet doesn't the un-
derlying theory of desert apply regardless of whether public use 
results in the highest" valued use? Is a private party entitled to cap-
ture publicly created value just because that value is not the high-
est? If the public does not have a property interest in the value 
that it creates, then a private party will be able to exploit the pub-
lic by capturing that value without giving the public any return on 
its investment. Unless a public property interest is recognized, the 
private party will not have to buy out the public interest. 
Nor does Rose adequately account for situations where the pub-
lic interest is difficult, if not impossible, to value. Although the 
process of valuing environmental assets has progressed signifi-
cantly/97 accurate valuation of the public interest in natural re-
sources still may not be possible for a variety of reasons. The dif-
fuseness of the public interest in natural resources, the intangible 
nature of some public interests, and the absence of an effective 
market for measuring public preferences all contribute to the valu-
ation problem. The inability to measure the full value created by 
public interest in a resource should not necessarily favor private 
rights, at least not when the holders of the private rights would be 
196 Id. at 77Q (emphasis in original). 
197 Cf., e.g., Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives (D. Decker & G. Goff eds. 
1987) (providing state-of-the-art information on methods of valuing wildlife). But cf. Sagoff, 
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1393 (1981) (criticizing reli-
ance on economic theory and market values to justify environmental regulation). 
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nonpaying beneficiaries of the publicly created value. Perhaps the 
answer is to "fudge" the estimates of the value created by nonex-
clusive, open-ended public use; the valuator could simply assume 
that, because of the sheer numbers, such use must produce the 
highest value. In any event, Rose's analysis seems to assume an 
ability to value the public interest not necessarily present in the 
real world. Eliminating the highest value requirement admittedly 
would mean that the public interest, if preferred, would not neces-
sarily promote optimal use. But at least such a step would make 
accurate valuations less important and thus would permit recogni-
tion of a public property right in less compelling, but nevertheless 
important, circumstances. 
Noneconomic justifications also are, for the most part, missing 
from the Rose theory of inherently public property.198 To the ex-
tent that private property rights fit into our overall theory of gov-
ernment, political ideology and philosophy would appear to offer as 
important a basis for public property as economic thinking. If, as 
many assert, private property rights are supposed to serve impor-
tant political and ethical values, then it seems logical to extend the 
public property concept to promote those values when the private 
system fails to do so.199 Political exploitation achieved through rna-
198 As explained above, she hints at a moral foundation to her theory, but fails to incorpo-
rate that foundation into her two criteria. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. In 
addition, she suggests the possibility of some noneconomic applications of her theory, but 
no conclusions are reached. See Rose, supra note 168, at 779-81. 
••• For discussions of the political importance of private property rights, see L. Becker, 
Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 75-80 (1977); Liberty, Property, and the Founda-
tions of the American Constitution (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds. 1989); Philbrick, Changing 
Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691 (1938); and Reich, supra note 172, at 
771-74. For a discussion of their moral importance, see L. Becker, supra, ~t 81-87. See gen-
erally L. Becker, supra (exploring the different philosophic foundations of property); 
Michelman, supra note 68, at 1202-13 (summarizing different theories of property). 
Both public and private property rights appear to be playing a crucial role in the develop-
ment of a new political structure for Eastern European countries. An English-language draft 
of the statement of principles being used in writing the new Czechoslovakian Constitution, 
for example, devotes an entire article to the concept of property. Among other principles, 
the article declares that "[o]wnership is inviolable," that "(a]ll forms of ownership are equal 
and enjoy equal protection," and that "(e]xpropriation is possible only with compensation." 
Civic Forum in Bohemia and Moravia, Statement of Principles for First Draft of the New 
Czechoslovak Constitution art. VII (English-language draft) [hereinafter cited as Czech. 
Statement of Principles] (copy on file with author). In addition, the statement recognizes 
"all forms of ownership which serve the general benefit and welfare of the country and 
advance enterprise and prosperity" and declares the earth's waters, energy resources, and 
raw materials to be in the "exclusive ownership of the state." ld. Finally, the statement 
allows state "intervention into economic activity ... only in urgent cases, on the basis of 
law," to "preserve live [sic] and health," to "preserve and protect a sound natural environ-
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nipulation of private property can be just as devastating as eco-
nomic exploitation. Thus, for example, public property rights may 
deserve recognition when a resource becomes so scarce, valuable, 
and vital that recognition is needed to preserve the peace, ensure 
fair and equitable results, and maintain democratic values. Alter-
natively, public property rights may be justifiable when a resource 
is closely linked to fundamental political rights, much like naviga-
ble waters are linked to the right to travel or the broadcast spec-
trum is linked to freedom of speech.200 Recognition of public prop-
erty rights, in other words, may become necessary when our 
private property system no longer allocates interests in resources 
consistent with crucial aspects of our political ideology. 
Using political theory and democratic values to justify public 
property rights would remove some of the tangibleness required by 
the Rose analysis. Her explanation of inherently public property 
tends to tie the concept to physical resources like roads and water-
ways and to traditional property rights like ownership and use.201 
Though the public interest in natural resources often will include 
traditional property interests in physical resources, it also may in-
volve intangible concerns like environmental preservation and eco-
logical appreciation. Just because the interest is esoteric and intan-
gible, it does not necessarily follow that the public interest is not 
legitimate nor valuable. To the contrary, ecological purposes, if ef-
fectively pursued, can have significant long~term benefits.202 
Recognition of these intangible public interests may require 
some broadening of the public property concept to include not 
ment," and to ens1,1re the "nourishment" of the population, the "protection of the rights and 
freedoms of citizens," and the "interests of the national defense." ld. 
200 Although Rose defines navigable waters as inherently public property and the broad-
cast spectrum as public goods, she appears to rely solely on economic justifications. See 
Rose, supra note 168, at 718-19, 753-58, 764-66, 769-70. 
201 See Rose, supra note 168. At the end of her article, however, she explores, on a prelim-
inary basis only, some more abstract applications of her theory. See id. at 777-81. 
'
02 See, e.g., 1980 Council on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. 31-40 (discussing, among 
other topics, the utilitarian justifications for preserving endangered species); U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation 37-65 (OTA-0-206 Mar. 1984) 
(discussing the importance and value of wetlands); cf. also Stewart, Economics, Enuiron· 
ment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (arguing that the 
conflict between environmental quality and economic development is a false one). For exam-
ples of the economic benefits to be derived from natural resources, see L. Butler & M. Liv-
ingston, supra note 35, at 74-84, 100-01 (describing commercial and noncommercial uses of 
Virginia's coastal resources). Even weak environmental programs can produce surprising re-
sults. See generally Butler, supra note 101 (discussing the effectiveness of state environ-
mental programs). 
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only a right in the unorganized public that can be asserted against 
the government, but also the power to achieve a reallocation of re-
sources through proper government channels and in appropriate 
circumstances. That is, while recognition of a public property right 
may not always enable the public to take action against its govern-
ment, recognition may empower the public to pursue majoritarian 
measures perhaps even without having to account to private prop-
erty owners adversely affected by the measures.203 Such a property 
right thus would serve a legitimating function-legitimating future 
government action instigated by members of the unorganized pub-
lic pursuant to their property interest. 204 By expanding public 
property to include intangible, nontraditional property interests 
like this legitimating interest, the law would be better able to deal 
with all economic and political failures of the private property 
system. 
B. Instream Water Use as Public Property 
Instream water uses provide an excellent example of how the 
concept of public property is needed to complement private prop-
erty rights. As explained earlier, America's water allocation sys-
tems have tended to serve narrow categories of private interests 
having a clear consumptive-use orientation. For the most part, 
those systems have not accommodated the public interest in water 
resources, especially its interest in nonconsumptive or noncommer-
cial uses like environmental preservation, ecological appreciation, 
and recreational pursuits. With the riparian doctrine's focus on 
privately owned waterfront land and its preference for reasonable 
domestic uses, the doctrine would seem, as a practical matter, to 
provide little protection for instream water use.2011 Nor does the 
prior appropriation doctrine offer much hope for the public inter-
est in instream use. Due to the doctrine's actual diversion and ben-
eficial use requirements, consumptive uses clearly are favored over 
203 Under the federal Constitution, government may not take private property for public 
use without payment of just compensation. U.S. Const. amend V. Whether this constitu-
tional guarantee would be violated by majoritarian measures adopted pursuant to the sug-
gested type of public interest is a question beyond the scope of the present article. For 
further discussion of the relationship between environmental regulation and the takings 
principle, see Butler, supra note 101, part I.A. 
204 For further discussion of this legitimating function, see. Butler, supra note 101, part 
I.B.2. 
205 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text. 
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nonconsumptive interests. 206 Recognition of public property rights 
in environmental water uses thus appears to be the only effective 
way to correct the deficiencies of the private water rights systems. 
Such recognition has already begun to occur in a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions. As explained earlier, changes to statutory and 
common law are forcing consideration of the public interest in the 
water allocation process. Although these changes are rarely, if ever, 
couched in terms of public property, they do involve many of the 
characteristics of property. The changes, for example, typically 
give a use right either to the unorganized public or to its represen-
tative, the government.207 Additionally, the public interest being 
recognized often limits private rights in the same resource and gen-
erally can be protected in court.208 Finally, at least some {;hanges 
require the public interest in instream uses to be defined in the 
same terms as private rights. Under these laws, for example, public 
rights must have quantitative limits and acquire a priority status 
similar to private rights. 209 
In addition to having many of the characteristics of property, 
instream water rights also reflect economic and political values un-
derlying the concept of public property. As will be explained mo-
mentarily, utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications work well in 
the instream use context. The development of public property 
rights in environmental water uses, in other words, is precisely the 
type of action the law should be taking to correct the economic and 
political failures of the private water rights systems. Jurisdictions 
thus need to recognize the importance of the public property con-
cept in the instream use context. Some of the economic, political, 
and ethical justifications supporting such recognition are examined 
below. 
206 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
207 See, e.g., supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing one court's expansion 
of the public trust doctrine to include environmental uses in the unorganized public); supra 
note 135 and accompanying text (discussing a Montana law that provides for instream use 
rights in the government). 
208 See, e.g., supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing how the public trust 
interest in instream uses could result in the modification of water allocation decisions and 
how the public trust interest might limit private rights); supra note 139 (citing statutory 
provisions that provide for judicial protection of minimum flow levels). 
209 See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing the priority status granted 
holders of instream water rights); supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing a reser-
vation program providing for quantitative limits). 
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1. Utilitarian Justifications 
Absent recognition of public environmental water rights, private 
parties have no incentive to consider the public interest in noncon-
sumptive use of water resources. Despite calls for the establish-
ment of a comprehensive water rights market, such a structure has 
not, to date, been developed.210 Among other problems, the current 
market structure often imposes artificial restrictions on alienation 
of water rights211 and generally only focuses on traditional con-
sumptive uses. It fails, for example, to give adequate consideration 
to the value of the return flow generated by water uses. 212 Since 
the current water market does not even adequately account for pri-
vate interests, its failure to accommodate the more diffused inter-
ests of the public in nonconsumptive uses should not be surprising. 
The absence of a comprehensive market suggests the possibility 
of a market failure. Because transferability is limited under the 
current water rights systems, it is easy to imagine a situation where 
the market does not promote socially optimal uses. The public in-
terest in ecological or recreational water use is not directly recog-
nized by traditional water allocation principles or by many statu-
tory modifications of those principles.213 Thus, holders of private 
21° For arguments for a market approach to water rights, see C. Meyers & R. Posner, 
Market Transfers of Water Rights: Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources (Na-
tional Water Comm'n 1971). See generally 1 Waters and Water Rights §§ 60-64 (R. Clark 
ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978) (discussing economics and its relation to water law). 
211 The traditional riparian doctrine, for example, prohibits the interbasin transfer of 
water, or the diversion of water from a watercourse to areas located outside of the watershed 
or basin of the watercourse. Though their rationale for the prohibition is not always clear, 
courts apparently reason that such a transfer would violate the requirement that water must 
be used for the benefit of riparian land. See Butler, supra note 1, at 108-25, 154-56. The 
riparian doctrine, however, does allow severability of riparian rights. That is, in the majority 
of riparian jurisdictions, the owner of riparian land can sever the water rights that attach to 
that land and transfer the rights without conveying the land. See id. at 137-43. For further 
analysis of the severability and transferability of riparian rights, see id. at 137-56. 
Most modern permit systems also do not allow free transferability. See Butler, Defining a 
Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 439, 456-57 . 
... See R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.11, at 56-57; Butler, supra note 1, at 150-51. See 
generally Butler, supra note 211, at 454-58 (discussing the nature of the water market). 
According to one prominent water law scholar, the water market "cannot be relied upon to 
always produce optimum results" in part because of "the physical properties of water, its 
transient nature, and the interdependence of its use in common by a number of users" and 
because of "acknowledged imperfections in the market for water and water rights." 
Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic · Forces, and .Public Regula· 
tion, 5 Nat. Resources J. 1, 39 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 
213 As explained earlier, some modern permit systems have corrected this oversight. See 
supra Part III. 
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water rights generally do not need to consider that interest in mak-
ing water use decisions. Although the organized public admittedly 
could force consideration of the public interest through the exer-
cise of the government's eminent domain power, that type of 
government action typically is reserved for public consumptive 
needs. 214 The interest of the unorganized public in nonconsumptive 
uses thus would, in all likelihood, fall through the cracks of the 
current market structure, absent affirmative judicial or legislative 
recognition of the interest. 
Applying the Rose criteria for inherently public property sug-
gests that such recognition is warranted under the public property 
concept. Watercourses easily qualify as the type of resource subject 
to the holdout problem. Because of the confined location of water-
ways, a person owning land along a river or stream could easily 
control the flow of the watercourse. 2111 Whether such control neces-
sarily means that the public interest in nonconsumptive uses is 
susceptible to private economic exploitation is. not as clear. 
To an extent, the answer will depend on the nature of the spe-
cific use being promoted and on the strength of the public interest 
in that use. Instream uses like navigation present compelling ex-
amples of public interests subject to the private holdout power: be-
cause of the economic benefits derived from traveling navigable 
waters, a private party in a strategic geographic position could eas-
ily exploit public demand for navigation.216 Other instream uses 
like recreational activities and ecological preservation are not as 
clear-cut. If the public interest in such a use already has been ex-
pressed informally over time through habit or custom, then the 
public interest could, if intense enough, represent a value or in-
vestment that is capable of private exploitation. 217 The public's in-
vestment in a resource need not be measurable in precise monetary 
214 Indeed, under a restrictive interpretation of the public use requirement, such a result 
may be mandated. The just compensation clause of the federal and state constitutions em-
powers government to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensa-
tion. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V; Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; Va. Const. art. I, § 11. To the 
extent that this requirement is interpreted literally to mean actual public use, nonconsump-
tive public interests would not provide a basis for the exercise of the eminent domain power. 
See generally Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Or. L. Rev. 203, 
204-25 (1978) (discussing and analyzing broad and narrow approaches to the public use re-
quirement). For a criticism of the expansive reading given the public use requirement by the 
United States Supreme Court, see R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 161-81. 
210 Rose, supra note 168, at 753-54, 757-58. 
2
'
8 Accord id. at 735-39, 753-61. 
211 Accord id. at 759-60. 
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terms for value to exist. Emotional investments also create demand 
and therefore value218 and can, in some ways, make a party more 
vulnerable to exploitation. To the extent, then, that the public al-
ready has developed the habit of using a waterway for birdwatch-
ing, hiking, and other ecological pursuits, these habits would ap-
pear to be susceptible to private exploitation.219 But if the public 
interest is vague and, as yet, undefined or unestablished, then the 
case for a holdout problem is considerably weaker, and any recog-
nition of public property rights for that specific instream use must 
rest on other grounds. In any event, because of the overlapping 
nature of many instream uses, preservation of waterways for public 
navigational purposes will result in the promotion of other in-
stream uses as well. Thus, if one instream use merits attention be-
cause of the holdout problem, other instream uses also will benefit. 
. A similar type of analysis would apply under Rose's second crite-
rion, the publicness or relative value test. At least when the in-
stream use is navigation, the public interest in the nation's water-
ways presents an easy case for review. Navigable watercourses are 
an important avenue of commerce, and commerce, in turn, is one 
of the key socializing activities having increasing returns to scale. 
The greater the public participation in commerce, the larger the 
productivity and the higher the value created by public use.220 
Open-ended public participation in navigation, in other words, re-
sults in increasing rates of return. 221 
The public interest in other instream uses is not as easy to eval-
218 Accord id. at 759. 
210 The more intangible a use, however, the more one can question whether a private 
party really can exploit public value. Cf. id. at 781 {questioning whether private parties can 
"siphon off the value of expansive public uses"). 
no Jd. at 766-71, 775-76. 
221 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of navigational use, see 1987-1988 Council on 
Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. 107-09. The intent of this analysis is not to suggest that 
public navigational use should be unmanaged or that unlimited navigation by individual 
members of the public would lead to increasing returns to scale. At some point, if too many 
members of the public actually use a river or stream for navigation, the watercourse may 
become overcrowded and commerce could be hindered. Other costs of overcrowding also 
would result. Ecological habitats, for example, would experience greater disturbance as wa~ 
tercourses reached and surpassed their optimal carrying capacity. States have recognized 
the ecological costs of navigation-related activities in their regulatory programs. See; e.g., 
Va. Marine Resources Comm'n, Subaqueous Guidelines for the Permitting of Activities 
Which Encroach in, on or over the Submerged Lands of the Commonwealth of Virginia 8-9 
{revised Mar. 1986). Increasing public participation, however, does not necessarily require 
actual use by all participants. Public participation, for example, could occur through forma-
tion of groups or companies in the business of navigation or through group use of ships or 
boats. 
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uate. But, though the argument is more difficult to make, instream 
uses like recreational activities and ecological pursuits also seem to 
involve significant public value, if not increasing returns to scale. 
For example, since recreational activities serve an important social 
purpose,222 greater public participation should enhance the value 
of recreational sites. The higher the number of public users inter-
ested in a recreational resource, the greater the potential for posi-
tive socialization effects and the higher the value of the recrea-
tional resource. 223 Ecological uses of waterways similarly involve a 
socializing element: one person's goal of improved environmental 
quality, for instance, cannot be realized without the help of 
others.224 Nonexclusive, open-ended public participation in ecologi-
cal pursuits helps considerably to promote those pursuits and 
therefore is responsible for creating much, if not all, of the value 
resulting from ecological water use. The only way to achieve the 
ecological and recreational goals of instream use is through collec-
tive action, and the greater the public commitment, the larger the 
return. The very publicness of instream uses like environmental 
preservation and recreational pursuits thus produces the value of 
the uses, which, in turn, can be exploited by private parties.22~ 
222 See Rose, supra note 168, at 779-81. 
223 Once again, this analysis is not suggesting that open-ended public use necessarily in-
volves unrestricted or unmanaged public use. See supra note 221. For increasing value to 
result, public recreational use must be managed either informally by the unorganized public 
through doctrines like customary or common rights or by the organized public. Cf. Rose, 
supra note 168, at 739-49 (discussing custom and the concept of a managed commons). 
Without appropriate management, the benefits of sociability could decrease as the number 
of users at any given place and point in time increase. Overcrowding at popular national 
parks, in other words, diminishes the immediate enjoyment of the users, though high public 
demand for a resource solidifies its position as a public resource. Furthermore, even with 
management, increasing public use can result in rising costs and therefore in a decreased 
return. For an example of a management plan designed to promote both the goals of envi-
ronmental preservation and public use, see Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of the 
Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Proposed State-Federal Land Exchange 
Involving Portions of False Cape State Park and Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge (1983). 
See also L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 4.4, at 86-89 (discussing the govern-
ment's response to problems caused by increasing public use of Back Bay and False Cape) . 
••• Others have expressed the societal value of environmental preservation in slightly dif-
ferent terms, focusing on the contemplative and civilizing effects of wilderness areas. See, 
e.g., R. Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (3d ed. 1982). 
"" The publicness of a use does not necessarily mean that a property right should be 
placed in the unorganized, as opposed to the organized, public. As explained earlier, ecologi-
cal and recreational public use may require management to ensure optimal social value. See 
supra notes 221, 223. Management could occur through common law doctrine recognizing 
the accountability of users to the public or through statutory law placing control in the 
government. 
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Whether the value created by public instream use is the highest 
value is not clear, however, due in large part to the difficulty of 
measuring ecological and recreational benefits. What is clear is 
that as more members of the public become committed to environ-
mental water use, the payoff resulting from their efforts increases. 
One person's participation in ecological and recreational instream 
uses becomes, in a sense, more valuable when reciprocated by 
others; wider-based use has a greater chance of becoming an estab-
lished practice. At the very least, then, greater public partic'ipation 
in instream uses will enhance the value of the affected water re-
source both from an environmental and an economic perspec-
tive-though for many instream uses, value comparisons with pri-
vate uses will be difficult to make. 
But even if the public value attached to instream uses is not the 
highest, the potential for private exploitation nevertheless exists. 
Because collective action is required for effective promotion of eco-
logical uses, the very enormity of such collective action suggests 
that any value generated by open-ended public involvement will be 
large and therefore tempting to private parties. Cleaner, healthier 
waters will result in more abundant aquatic resources and thus in 
more opportunities and incentives for exploitation. Further, to the 
extent that recreational uses have become established patterns of 
use, the emotional investment of the public will be high and there-
fore susceptible to exploitation. Because ecological and recreational 
pursuits are very useful to society, both in a socializing and an eco-
nomic sense, private users should not be allowed to significantly 
undermine the public's ecological and recreational investment in a 
resource. Even if the only focus of public property is the correction 
of market failures, private users still should be required to consider 
the public's investment in a resource.226 When a nonutilitarian fo-
cus is added, the need for such consideration becomes even clearer. 
Recreational and ecological uses sometimes will be conflicting. See, e.g., L. Butler & M. 
Livingston, supra note 35, § 4.4, at 86-89 (discussing conflicts between public recreational 
use and ecological interests). 
••• Some scholars have argued that this position improperly focuses on the social costs of 
private use, ignoring the beneficial externalities of private use. See H. Manne, supra note 
177, at 353-54. To the extent that a private use creates instream benefits enjoyed by the 
public at no cost, those benefits could be weighed against the social costs of the use to 
determine whether private economic exploitation really is occurring. Indeed, if significant 
instream benefits are created by private use, it seems doubtful that public use also would be 
generating significant value. In other words, the existence of significant privately created 
instream benefits seems to negate the possibility of publicness and thus of high publicly 
created value. 
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2. Political and Other Nonutilitarian Justifications 
Several noneconomic bases support recognizing public property 
rights in instream uses. One such basis focuses on the problem of 
political exploitation of property, or the exploitation of resources 
for political advantage in a manner inconsistent with fundamental 
political rights or democratic values. To the extent that private 
property rights are supposed to promote democratic values,227 a 
system of public property rights is needed to correct some of the 
failures of the private rights system.228 Though it may be difficult 
to reach a consensus on when the failures exist or on what the 
democratic values are, at least some of the more compelling cases 
arguably are identifiable. As explained earlier, those cases would 
involve political exploitation of resources vital to the public health 
or welfare and resources related to fundamental political rights 
and values. 229 
To the extent that waterways are navigable, they clearly present 
the potential for political exploitation. If the public interest in nav-
igation were not considered a property right, private parties could 
exploit the public's need for navigation, significantly curtailing ac-
cess to navigable waters absent payment of appropriate extortion 
fees. In addition to losing important commercial advantages, mem-
bers of the public also would have their fundamental right to 
travel abridged. Preservation of key democratic values thus would 
require recognition of the public interest in the instream use of 
navigation. 230 
227 The relationship between property rights and political theory has been explored in 
depth by other commentators. For some examples, see supra note 199. 
••• Professor Sax seems to be making a similar argument in his famous article on the 
public trust doctrine. In that article he asserts that courts should use the public trust doc-
trine to promote "democratization" and "equality of political power." Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 
560-61 (1970). He identities four benchmarks for determining when public trust rights 
should be recognized: (1) government disposal of public property below market value with 
no obvious reason for the subsidy; (2) government action that empowers a private interest to 
make resource-use decisions which could subordinate public use needs to that private inter-
est; (3) the reallocation of diffuse public uses to private uses or to narrower public concerns; 
and (4) the use of a resource for unnatural purposes. ld. at 562-65. 
One philosophy scholar has argued for recognition of a constitutional right to environmen· 
tal quality. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 Yale L.J. 205, 265-67 
(1974). For a critical response, see Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitu-
tional Structures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 Yale L.J. 545 (1975). 
••• See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. Rose recognizes this possibility in the 
context of free speech. See Rose, supra note 168, at 778-79. 
230 Traditional caselaw appears to reflect this thinking. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 
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Across-the-board recognition of other instream uses as public 
property may not be consistent with the political exploitation ra-
tionale. On the surface, other instream uses do not appear to raise 
the same fundamental concerns about political rights and demo-
cratic values as the navigational use. An argument probably could 
be made that ecological uses are linked to democratic values. Some 
might assert that, in a country based on equal opportunity, private 
landowners should not control access to the rich environments of 
the nation's waters-that the ecological fate of those waters should 
not be in the hands of a privileged class of landowners. 231 This ar-
gument might be more convincing in a state that has added envi-
ronmental provisions to its constitution.232 But unless such a provi-
sion is effectively worded,233 it is difficult to see how the ecological 
access argument raised above really presents a problem of political 
exploitation rather than a matter of environmental ethics.234 
Despite the lack of a compelling argument for across-the-board 
protection, instream uses other than navigation may nevertheless 
merit protection under the political exploitation rationale in cer-
tain limited situations. If, for example, the environmental quality 
of a vital waterbody has reached the point where it poses a serious 
threat to the public health, then the political exploitation rationale 
arguably would justify recognition of a public property right in the 
instream use of environmental preservation. The key to such rec-
ognition would be the importance of the waterway to the public 
and the severity of the threat. If either factor is compelling 
enough, the failure to recognize some sort of public right could en-
able a private party with sufficient control over the resource to ex-
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11, 414 (1842); see also Sax, supra note 228, at 484. 
23
' Cf. Sagoff, supra note 228, at 265-67 (arguing that environmental quality is deeply 
entrenched in our cultural tradition and therefore in our Constitution); Sax, supra note 228, 
at 565 (suggesting that the "extraordinary diversity of many natural systems" might support 
the recognition of public trust rights). 
232 Most states have incorporated some sort of environmental provision into their consti-
tutions, but the provisions vary significantly. See generally Butler, supra note 101, part l.B 
(discussing environmental provisions in state constitutions). 
233 Many of the provisions are vaguely worded, providing few explicit details to guide 
courts in applying the provisions. Some courts accordingly have interpreted the provisions 
as nonbinding policy statements. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 101, part I.B.l (discussing 
such a decision). For alternatives to that approach, see id. part I.B.2. 
234 Several commentators have similarly rejected a broad-based constitutional theory of 
environmental protection. See, e.g., Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Mainte-
nance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 211, 
216-17; Tribe, supra note 228. Some have also rejected any nonutilitarian basis for a com-
mon law right to environmental protection. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra, at 216-17. 
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plait public dependence on the health of the waterway and gain 
inappropriate political power.2311 Similarly, if the ecology of a par-
ticular waterbody is unique, high public demand for the resource 
could create the potential for political exploitation; private parties 
in a position to control the resource could abuse the political pro-
cess by exploiting public demand for the resource.236 
In addition to the political exploitation rationale, some morally 
based justifications provide support for the recognition of public 
property rights in instream uses. Professor Rose momentarily fo-
cuses on one of those moral rationale in developing her criteria for 
inherently public property. She notes that when nonexclusive, 
open-ended public use creates a property's highest value the public 
deserves a right in the resource.237 Rose's reliance on this moral 
basis for recognizing public property admittedly is limited; her eco-
nomic thinking tempers the development of her moral foundation, 
allowing it to have weight only when it is consistent with the eco-
nomic goal of promoting optimal use. 
The basic moral proposition that she suggests, though, is intui-
tively appealing, and if applied in the public property sphere as it 
has been in the private sphere, it could have fa,r-reaching conse-
quences. For hundreds of years, philosophers have justified the ex-
istence of private property rights by arguing that a person who la-
bors to develop a resource deserves the fruits of that labor.238 
Absent from those justifications is any requirement that the labor 
produce the highest valued use. One apparent explanation for this 
absence is that if a laborer does not create the highest value of a 
resource, a second party who could produce that value would buy 
out the first. Thus, as long as the law allows such buyouts, there is 
no need to require a private user to produce the highest value; the 
marketplace would automatically correct inefficiencies in use by 
encouraging transfers to the efficient user. Because efficient mar-
1130 Some might argue that recognition of public property rights is not necessary in such a 
situation because of pollution laws. This argument ignores the realities of current enforce-
ment efforts, which often are ineffective and virtually nonexistent. For a discussion of the 
inadequate implementation and enforcement structure of state environmental programs, see 
Butler, supra note 101, part IV.A. 
238 Rose also suggests that the uniqueness of a resource might justify public rights, but 
she relies on her economic theory of inherently public property. See Rose, supra note 168, 
at 781 n.329. 
137 Id. at 770. 
138 See, e.g., L. Becker, supra note 199, at 48-56; J. Locke, supra note 170, ch. 5; see also 
Michelman, supra note 68, at 1203-05 (summarizing the various moral or desert theories 
developed to justify private property rights). 
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ketplace transactions are more difficult to achieve in the public 
sphere, Rose may have decided to limit application of the moral 
desert theory to situations where it was consistent with economic 
thinking. Thus, her stipulation that the public deserves a property 
right when its use creates the highest value could simply reflect her 
unease over inefficiencies inherent in the public sphere. 
Such a result, though appealing from an economic perspective, 
ignores the basic point being made by the moral desert rationale. If 
the publicness of a resource creates value, then under this rationale 
the public would seem to have a moral right to that value. Because 
the moral desert rationale is appealing and has gained some ac-
ceptance in the private rights system, 239 it seems both logical and 
fair to extend the rationale to the public sphere at least in certain 
limited situations. Among other possibilities, such an extension 
could occur when the publicly created value is significant enough 
and definite enough to permit identification and to make the pri-
vate holdout situation possible .. Public instream uses that meet 
these conditions thus should be justifiable as public property rights 
under the moral desert theory. 
A second moral basis for recognizing public property rights 
in instream uses involves the concept of stewardship, or the notion 
that man has a moral obligation to present and future generations 
and to natural communities to act as a steward of the earth's 
resources. 2" 0 In recent years, scholars have debated the merits and 
the meaning of this proposition.2 " 1 Though no consensus has been 
reached, support for the stewardship concept is growing, as evi-
denced by the increase in environmental laws and in the wide-
spread adoption of environmental provisions in state constitu-
tions. 2" 2 To the extent that the stewardship concept is accepted,243 
230 Some, for example, interpret the adverse possession doctrine as reflecting a moral or 
desert rationale. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 475-77 (1897). See 
generally Symposium: Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 
661·865 (1986) (discussing, among other topics, the policy implications of adverse 
possession). 
••• For a comprehensive treatment of the stewardship concept, see Symposium: Steward-
ship of Land and Natural Resources, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 301-668 [hereinafter cited as 
Stewardship Symposium] . A draft statement of principles proposed for consideration in 
writing the new Czechoslovak Constitution recognizes the stewardship concept as one of 
only three obligations of the citizens of Czechoslovakia. See Czech. Statement of Principles, 
supra note 199, art. V. 
••• See generally Stewardship Symposium, supra note 240. 
••• For a discussion of the different environmental programs now applicable in the United 
States, see 1-2 Law of Environmental Protection, supra note 146. For a discussion of envi-
ronmental provisions in state constitutions, see Butler, supra note 101, part LB. 
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recognition of public property rights in instream uses would be one 
way to fulfill the stewardship obligation. 
On a related matter, some scholars have argued that environ-
mental decisionmaking should occur through collective action to 
ensure that ethically responsible choices are made.2 " 4 Under this 
position, collective action would be necessary not to meet the stew-
ardship obligation, but rather to have morally responsible laws. 
Recognizing public property rights in resources meeting Rose's cri-
teria for inherently public property would fulfill this moral respon-
sibility since, through the publicness of the resource, the public has 
collectively, but informally, demonstrated its choice. Thus, in addi-
tion to promoting the stewardship concept, public property rights 
in instream uses also would, under appropriate circumstances, en-
sure the development of ethical environmental laws. 
V. SoME CoNCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE EvoLUTION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS 
In recent years, the legal system has developed a number of de-
vices for protecting the public interest in instream use. Though the 
devices vary significantly in form and in content, they collectively 
represent an important evolutionary trend: the legitimation of 
public rights in instream water use. But while the current devices 
represent an important political and environmental victory, they 
generally fail to provide a principled or coherent way to define the 
relationship between newly recognized public rights and traditional 
private interests. Because the current forms of instream protection 
alter the scope of private water rights, that relationship will be-
come increasingly important as the demand for water resources 
rises. For the instream protection movement to be complete, then, 
the evolutionary process must achieve the integration of public and 
private water rights. A principled way of resolving conflicts be-
tween emerging public interests and established private rights is 
needed to ensure the long-term acceptance and effectiveness of 
public environmental water rights. The public property concept 
.. 
3 A discussion of the merits of the stewardship concept is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. For a good discussion of the different arguments and for an ethical justification of envi-
ronmental decisionmaking, see Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 337. 
2
" See, e.g., H. Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics 246-48 (1988); see also Farber, supra 
note 243, at 354-60 (arguing for environmental decisionmaking by social democracy or ma-
jority rule). 
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can provide such a principled approach. 
Utilitarian principles suggest that lawmakers need to realize the 
wisdom of complementing private water rights systems with public 
property rights in instream use. Though economic theory normally 
supports private property rights, utilitarian principles nevertheless 
justify recognition of public instream rights when two conditions 
exist: one, an instream use is susceptible to the private holdout 
problem and, two, public instream use would generate either the 
highest value of the property or at least a significant value that is 
reasonably identifiable and definite. Because waterways are vital 
resources having a relatively confined location, they are precisely 
the type of resource that generally satisfies these two conditions. 
Whether a particular instream use similarly satisfies the two crite-
ria will depend on the nature of the use. 
The likelihood and severity of the private holdout problem, for 
example, will vary according to the use. While virtually all naviga-
tional uses present a compelling case for private exploitation, rec-
reational uses raise much weaker grounds for concern. Only de-
fined areas of established recreational importance to the public 
would appear to merit consideration under the private holdout 
test. While ecological uses present similar problems under the 
holdout criterion, the magnitude of these problems will depend, to 
an extent, on the nature of the environmental interest at stake. 
Whereas preservation of particular ecological habitats or wildlife 
communities may require site-specific determinations of private 
holdout potential, protection of water quality may enjoy a broader 
approach. Because the qualitative health of a watercourse is de-
pendent on land use activities occurring within its watershed,2" 11 
waterfront landowners have the power to control the health of the 
resource and therefore to exploit public dependence on water qual-
ity. In any event, even when an ecological use is site-specific, recog-
nition of public rights in that use may require instream protection 
for the entire stream. 
Satisfaction of the value criterion also depends on the nature of 
the use. Public navigational uses, with their link to commerce, 
clearly result in increasing returns to scale and thus in the highest 
valued use. The comparative values of public recreational and eco-
... The waters of the Chesapeake Bay, for example, are affected by farming practices oc· 
curring throughout the Bay's extensive watershed. See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, 
supra note 35, §§ 3.1.A, 3.2.A, 3.3 (discussing the physical characteristics of the Bay and the 
geological and chemical processes affecting those characteristics). 
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logical uses are not as easy to determine. Because of the socializa-
tion effects of recreational and ecological uses, greater public in-
volvement should produce increasing value, especially in the 
context of ecological use. As the public commitment to ecological 
water use grows, the value of public participation will increase; en-
vironmental protection efforts simply do not work well without sig-
nificant public support. But whether that use is the highest valued 
use is not clear due in part to the difficulty of measuring publicly 
created value and to the speculativeness of the valuation process. 
What is clear is that the value created by public ecological water 
use will be significant enough to entice private parties to reap the 
benefits of the use. If the amount recaptured is large, public efforts 
to further ecological purposes will be seriously undermined. Thus, 
even if the publicly created value is not the highest value, a signifi-
cant public investment will be misdirected absent recognition of 
public property rights. 
The inability of public recreational and ecological water uses to 
clearly produce the highest value would be enough to convince 
some of the inadvisability of recognizing public property rights in 
those uses. This position ignores not only the difficulty of making 
value comparisons in the public and the environmental contexts, 
but also the existence of other value systems.246 Besides economic 
theory, political and ethical theories also serve as important 
sources of societal values. The public interest in navigation, for ex-
ample, has long been accepted as an integral part of our political 
structure. Freedom to travel and prosper would mean little to 
those dependent on the nation's waterways if the waterways were 
monopolized by a select few. Nonnavigational environmental water 
uses pose a much weaker case for political recognition of public 
property rights; the public interest in those uses would implicate 
fundamental political values only in rare situations. Recreational 
and ecological uses, however, fare better under theories of morality 
and ethics. Notions of just desert and stewardship are intricately 
connected to these types of public environmental water use, espe-
cially ecological water use. Large-scale public efforts to preserve 
the environment of water resources for recreational and ecological 
purposes can generate significant value.247 Unless the public 
.. a For a more thorough discussion of the need to consider noneconomic values in envi-
ronmental decisionmaking, see Farber, supra note 243. 
••• See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, ch. 4 (discussing the value 
and impact of man's use of Virginia's coastal resources). 
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reaches a consensus that the only important value system is eco-
nomic theory, the public deserves to recoup some of the value that 
it creates. 
Growing acceptance of the stewardship concept suggests that 
such a consensus has not been reached. Indeed, if any value system 
is emerging in the area of resource management, it is the notion 
that man owes some sort of obligation to the present and future 
inhabitants of the earth. While proving the emergence of this sys-
tem admittedly is difficult, evidence of its development can be 
found worldwide in all walks of life:248 in the expanding scope of 
environmental laws, in the increasingly aggressive enforcement ef-
forts of environmental regulators, 249 in the growing international 
movement for environmental quality,2110 in the surprising adoption 
of resource management programs by environmentally conserva-
tive jurisdictions,2111 in the public outrage over serious environmen-
tal accidents, and in the efforts of some Eastern Europeans to 
make environmental quality a constitutional value.2112 Finally, it 
can be seen in the trust that the American people place, perhaps 
naively, in their government to provide the fundamentals of envi-
ronmental quality-clean air and water. In the end, _then, the pub-
lic interest in environmental water use becomes a matter of trust. 
For years the American people have taken their natural resources 
for granted, in part because of their abundance but also because of 
the faith that the people have put in their government to imple-
ment federal environmental law and properly manage the nation's 
resources. If this trust is not enough to justify recognition of public 
••• Cf. Farber, supra note 243, at 354-58 (discussing the need for social democracy and 
ways to define public opinion). 
249 For examples of these enforcement efforts, see Bender, Farming Family Loses Wet· 
lands Violation Suit, Daily Press, Jan. 27, 1990, at C1, col. 5 (discussing precedent-setting 
wetlands violation suit), and Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1990, at A2, col. 5 (discussing recent 
appellate decision upholding conviction and jail sentence for unauthorized wetlands filling). 
••• In 1987, for example, a number of countries signed the first international treaty on air 
quality. See Note, An Attempt to Stop the Sky from Falling: The Montreal Protocol to 
Protect Against Atmospheric Ozone Reduction, 15 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 391, 393 
(1989); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 14-
16, 1987, U.N. Environment Programme. See generally 1985 Council on Environmental 
Quality Ann. Rep. chs. 5-13 (discussing international environmental problems); 1981 Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. ch. 8 (discussing the global environment). 
'"' See, e.g., Chesapeake Executive Council, The First Progress Report Under the 1987 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1-11 (Jan. 1989) (where the traditionally conservative state of 
Virginia joined other jurisdictions in executing a management program for the Chesapeake 
Bay). 
••• See Czech. Statement of Principles, supra note 199, art. V. 
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environmental water rights, then our system of democratic deci-
sionmaking is fundamentally flawed. 
